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complexity, but I would give my life for the simplicity on the 
other side of complexity.
–Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
INTRODUCTION 
In 1872, an American newspaper called the Woman’s Exponent
began publication.  The Exponent’s subtitle trumpeted “the Rights of 
Women of all Nations,”1 and during more than forty years of twice-monthly 
publication, the paper remained focused on women’s issues in a “tone . . . 
neither self-conscious nor cautious, and it firmly and directly discussed 
feminist ideas. . . .”2  For example, one early column asserted that “[w]oman 
was designed to be something more than a domestic drudge,”3 and a few 
years later, in 1877, the paper editorialized: “Woman feels her servitude, 
her degradation, and she is determined to assert her rights.”4
The editors of the Exponent shared the convictions of many 
nineteenth-century feminists, echoing in print the credo of the famous 
feminist and suffragette Elizabeth Cady Stanton that “[w]omen must stand 
up and speak for themselves.”5  To that end, the paper regularly “reported 
on the triumphs of women around the globe in achieving special awards or 
recognition.”6  In one story about a young San Francisco girl who had won 
an academic competition for a trip to Paris, the Exponent writer proclaimed 
that this was “quite a victory for the girls, and proves the oft repeated 
assertion that the brains of girls are not inferior to the brains of boys!”7  The 
Exponent also reported “progress made in the area of women’s rights 
around the country and around the world,” often reprinting speeches given 
at women’s political gatherings.  In 1890, the paper devoted a long article to 
documenting “the need for equal pay for equal work,”8 and, according to a 
prominent Exponent editor named Emmeline Wells, “[f]rom its first issue it 
was the champion of the suffrage cause. . . .”9
In light of the Exponent’s devotion to progressive feminism in the 
late nineteenth century, it would be hard to overestimate the commitment of 
the women who produced the journal to the cause of empowering women 
1
 Judith Rasmussen Dushku, Feminists, in MORMON SISTERS: WOMEN IN EARLY UTAH
178-79 (Claudia L. Bushman, ed.,1976). 
2 Id. at 178.
3 Id. at 183.
4 Id. at 178.
5 Id. at 179.
6 Id. at 183.
7 Id. at 184.
8 Id. at 182-83.
9 Id. at 184 n.21 (citing Susan B. Anthony, The History of Woman Suffrage, 6 vols., 
4:936-37 (Susan B. Anthony & Ida Husted Harper, eds., 1902)).
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everywhere or to the principle that women were as entitled to the pursuit of 
social independence, personal accomplishment, and political autonomy as 
men were.  Why, then, would so important an advocate for women’s (and 
human) rights as Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of the abolitionist classic 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, excoriate these same women for being complicit in 
“degrading bondage,” for being party to “a cruel slavery whose chains have 
cut into the very hearts of thousands of our sisters.”?10  Why would the 
popular nineteenth-century American author Jennie Froiseth declare that 
these activist women were part of a community that supported the 
“degradation of woman,” a community that could “flourish only where she 
[woman] is regarded and treated as a slave.”?11
Stowe, Froiseth, and many others were harshly critical because the 
robust feminists who produced the Woman’s Exponent were Mormons, 
members of Joseph Smith’s controversial Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints – a religion best known for its practice of polygamy.12  Indeed, 
observers then and now have found it difficult to understand how these 
compelling advocates of women’s progress could simultaneously 
countenance or even engage in plural marriage, which would seem to have 
been inherently coercive, sexist, and unfair.  This particular paradox, the 
dilemma of nineteenth-century Mormon women, is the initial focus of this 
article, as well as the point of access to a larger theme: the enduring paradox 
of community and autonomy – of the collective and the individual – in 
American society. 
Two principal terms of my analysis here, “community” and 
“autonomy,” are themselves rich with ambiguity, even paradoxical.  Part of 
what makes the community-autonomy tension a genuine paradox, rather 
than merely an interesting dichotomy, is that there exists no clean practical 
line separating the two ideals; to some degree, depending on one’s life 
circumstances, every human is simultaneously an autonomous individual 
(or at least lives by the necessary fiction of being a coherent self, capable of 
10 MRS. T. B. H. (FANNY) STENHOUSE, TELL IT ALL, THE STORY OF A WOMAN’S LIFE 
IN POLYGAMY, at vi (1890).
11
 Carrel Hilton Sheldon, Mormon Haters, in (Bushman, ed., supra note 1) 121 
(quoting KIMBALL YOUNG, ISN’T ONE WIFE ENOUGH? 11 (1954)).      
12
 The term “polygamy" may properly refer to any kind of plural marriage, although 
generally the term has come to mean a marriage consisting of one husband and several 
wives, probably (in American society, at least) because that is how Mormons practiced 
plural marriage in the nineteenth century and how current Mormon fundamentalists 
practice it in the intermountain West.  Here I will use “polygamy” and “plural marriage” 
interchangably in this conventional sense, denoting the marriage configuration of one man 
and more than one woman.  To be precise, though, the term “polygyny" defines the 
arrangement of one husband and plural wives, while "polyandry" means the opposite – one 
woman and plural husbands.  American law has tended to complicate this terminology, 
generally using the term “bigamy" (meaning, literally, one husband and two wives) to 
define all plural marriage situations.  
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meaningful agency) and a member of various communities (family, ethnic, 
religious, professional, etc.), such that it matters a great deal how we 
characterize the balance one might strike between the two ideals in a given 
situation, and, more important still, how we assess that particular choice of 
balance. 
Mormon polygamy, what many nineteenth-century critics called the 
“Mormon Problem,” provides a truly distinct historical context in which to 
explore this ongoing tension in American law and culture between the 
ideals of community and autonomy.  Its uniqueness notwithstanding, what 
the social phenomenon of Mormon polygamy produced in high relief was a 
variation on a quintessential American theme, played out in a clash of 
public narratives.  Nineteenth-century Mormon women found themselves in 
an exquisitely difficult position morally, emotionally, and practically: 
whether and how to reconcile their religious faith, which included 
polygamy, with their political and social commitments to the progress of 
women.  Put more broadly, these women experienced a deep conflict 
between community and autonomy, for their loyalty to religious community
appeared incompatible with their loyalty to the progressive vision of 
advancing the rights and individual autonomy of American women, 
including their own.13
The uniqueness of Mormon polygamy illuminates this classic 
paradox in new and instructive ways, especially as to issues of sexual 
politics, social identity, personal autonomy, and cultural legitimacy.14  The 
particular, concrete dilemmas that invariably issue from the paradox of 
community and autonomy are complex to begin with; their “telling” is more 
complicated still, and more consequential, because we come to “know” any 
particular social reality only by “reading” or “hearing” it as represented by 
other voices.  This narrative mediation of things is thus an inevitable, 
necessary process that is both hermeneutic (i.e., informing how we 
13
 Of course, we might talk also of a “community” of progressive women and men 
far larger than the religious community of Mormons to which I refer.  By the same token, 
we might emphasize the individualistic, autonomy-oriented aspects of Mormonism, a 
nascent American religion that claimed First Amendment protection for the actions of its 
members – namely, plural marriage – undertaken in order to practice their religious beliefs.   
This chicken-and-egg quality of the relationship between community and autonomy 
underscores the richness of the paradox.  
14 As I shall discuss in Part III, a remarkably similar cluster of community-
autonomy issues arises regarding the cultural and legal status of homosexuals in 
contemporary society, particularly on the question of same-sex marriage.  Indeed, the 
cultural and legal narratives that people use to portray gays and lesbians, and the social 
dynamics that attend those narratives, are rhetorically quite similar to the nineteenth-
century clash of narratives over Mormon polygamy.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986) and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) for “anti-gay“ 
narratives; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) for “pro-gay“ narratives.
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interpret) and epistemological (i.e., influencing how we know).  Once we 
recognize this all-encompassing condition of the narrative textuality of 
discourse,15 we can “look behind” any particular narrative – someone’s 
distinct telling of things – to analyze the rhetorical strategies that produced 
the narrative in the first place:  How are such dilemmas narrated on the 
public stage?  By whom? For what purpose, and with what interests in 
mind?  With what imagery? To what audience – and thus to what values – is 
this narrative meant to appeal?  
Understanding both the mediating influence of narratives and the 
importance of evaluating those narratives from a rhetorical standpoint is 
crucial to analyzing legal discourse in all of its operations – from 
legislators’ big picture debates about social values, to trial attorneys’ 
common sense courtroom narratives deployed to persuade juries, to judges’ 
precedent-minded policy rationales meant to justify court decisions (the 
dimension of legal discourse on which I will focus here), to law professors’ 
theoretical jurisprudential discussions in law journals.  At whatever level, 
legal discourse is, after all, the language of the law, whose purpose is to 
determine, establish, and legitimize the rules of human society.  As to 
Mormon polygamy, a seminal example of such discourse is the 1878 U.S. 
Supreme Court case of Reynolds v. United States.16
In Reynolds, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal anti-
polygamy laws.  In authoring the opinion, Chief Justice Morrisson Waite 
presented and justified the decision through a narrative championing the 
institution of conventional, monogamous marriage as the prime guarantor of 
social stability.  As part of this justifying narrative,17 the High Court 
15 For a more law-oriented discussion of the notion of textuality and related issues, see 
Gregory C. Pingree, Afterword: Toward Stable Principles and Useful Hegemonies, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 807 (2003).    
16
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
17 What I call here the Court’s “justifying narrative” is closely related to the more 
conventional concepts of the “judicial reasoning” or the “judicial rationale” of the 
opinion.  However, by “narrative” I mean a more encompassing, less circumscribed 
idea of textuality than these conventional terms connote.  As I have discussed above, 
narrative, undersood broadly, properly characterizes all purposeful discourse.  The 
judicial opinion is nothing if not purposeful in various important ways, from the 
purpose of maintaining or revising  precedent to the purpose of legally, historically, 
and culturally justifying the position taken and the values espoused.  Much of this 
rhetorical activity is implicit, of course, but that does not diminish the reality that 
judicial opinions, like all texts, are complex narratives,  themselves made of layers of 
other narratives.  The subject of narrative in legal discourse has been actively explored 
in legal scholarship for nearly two decades.  See generally Robert M. Cover, The 
Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
(1983); Special Issue: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); Daniel A. 
Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal 
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Special Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 
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affirmed the trial court’s warnings about the dangers that polygamy posed 
to “pure-minded women and . . . innocent children,” “victims” who would 
“multiply and spread themselves over the land.”18  The Court’s 
determination that Mormon polygamy was “subversive of good order,”19
and thus not protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, came at the expense of a particular group’s claim of religious 
freedom.  As such, Reynolds highlighted one important ground upon which 
the law tends to side with the community over the individual.  More 
precisely, the decision established a standard for privileging the more 
communal value of “good social order” over the more individualistic right 
of a particular community’s unconventional religious practice.20
 I have here introduced two kinds of public narrative – cultural and 
legal – by which Mormon polygamy was known in nineteenth-century 
America, and I have articulated the fundamental community-autonomy 
paradox that those narratives serve to illuminate.  I will pursue this 
discussion further in three parts.  In Part I, I will briefly review fundamental 
aspects of Mormon history, particularly those related to the practice of 
plural marriage.  In Part II, I will selectively consider how nineteenth-
century Mormon polygamy was represented on the public stage through 
both cultural and legal narratives.  I will analyze the rhetorical strategies at 
play in what became a nineteenth-century narrative battle over the 
legitimacy of Mormon polygamy.  In Part III, I will suggest how this 
rhetorical approach to the American “telling” of Mormon polygamy – a 
study of narratives meant to legitimize or delegitimize a core aspect of 
cultural identity – might usefully be applied to a contemporary social 
controversy that underscores the paradox of community and autonomy: 
homosexuality and the so-called culture wars over family values and the 
meaning of marriage.  I will conclude by briefly situating my rhetorical 
analysis of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy within the ongoing 
philosophical debate about the fate of liberalism in a democratic society.       
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF MORMON POLYGAMY  
The mark of religion is that it is the practice of an ultimate 
concern that orders all other concerns, an unconditioned 
loyalty that trumps all other loyalties.
– Reinhold Niebuhr
U. CHI. L. REV. 1363-1519 (1995); Symposium: Rethinking Robert Cover’s Nomos 
and Narrative, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2005).
18 Reynolds 98 U.S. at 168.
19 Id. at 164.
20 Employment Division v. Smith, 480 U.S. 916 (1990).
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According to Mormon history,21 in 1820, Joseph Smith, fourteen years 
old and part of a large, religiously diverse family in upstate New York, 
sought divine guidance regarding the many Christian sects competing for 
public attention during the Second Great Awakening.  In response to his 
efforts, the boy was visited by God the Father, Jesus Christ, and the Holy 
Spirit.  God informed Joseph that none of the churches then existing had the 
full truth; that God intended to restore to earth the true church as Christ had 
organized it two millennia earlier; and that he (Joseph Smith) would be the 
instrument of this restoration, the first prophet of modern times.
Over the next twenty-four years, Smith received various revelations 
about church organization and doctrine.  In 1830, he officially established 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints22 (indicating that Christ’s 
original church was now restored), members of which were called 
“Mormons” by most people because of the Book of Mormon, which Smith 
had translated from ancient records.  The Mormons considered (and still 
consider) the revelations that Joseph Smith received, as well as the Book of 
Mormon and the Bible, to constitute their body of holy scripture.
The Mormons came to the Great Basin desert after suffering years of 
social and legal persecution in New York, Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois, 
culminating in the June 1844 assassination of Joseph Smith in Carthage, 
Missouri.  General public hostility to the Mormons, at first a product of 
their cultish devotion to Smith, had increased significantly with the 
discovery, sometime during the late 1830s or early 1840s, that the church 
leader and some of his followers had commenced the practice of plural 
marriage. 
After Smith’s martyrdom in 1844, the Mormons made the arduous 
journey westward under the leadership of Brigham Young.  They settled in 
what is now the Salt Lake Valley in the summer of 1847, choosing this 
“largely uninhabited desert as the center place for the kingdom” so that they 
could “be left alone to freely establish a distinctive way of life that other 
21
 Many authors have published histories of the Mormons generally and of Mormon 
polygamy in particular.  A very good general history written by Mormon historians is 
LEONARD J. ARRINGTON AND DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF 
THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS (1979).  A useful history of polygamy by a Mormon author is 
RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY (1989).  Probably the most 
widely respected general history of the Mormons is by a non-Mormon: JAN SHIPPS, 
MORMONISM: THE STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS TRADITION (1987).  Two especially erudite 
histories by non-Mormon authors come from the literary critic HAROLD BLOOM, THE 
AMERICAN RELIGION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE POST-CHRISTIAN NATION (1992), and the 
legal historian SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).  Finally, for an 
excellent examination of the politics of Mormon polygamy in early twentieth-century 
America, see KATHLEEN FLAKE, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: THE 
SEATING OF SENATOR REED SMOOT, MORMON APOSTLE (2004).   
22
 Hence the common appellation “LDS,” which stands for “Latter-day Saints.” 
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communities had found so threatening and offensive.”23 Polygamy 
continued to be a central if not widespread24 part of this “distinctive way of 
life”; church members referred to plural marriage as “The Principle,” and 
the church officially acknowledged the practice as part of its doctrine in 
1852. 
Joseph Smith had boldly preached to his followers that polygamous 
marriage was “the most holy and important doctrine ever revealed to man 
on the earth,”25 a sacred tradition rooted in the Old Testament, a practice 
central to the full restoration of Christ’s true church, and a solemn ritual that 
“sealed” a man to each of his wives for all eternity.  This theological 
justification for plural marriage, enabled by Smith’s invocations of both Old 
and New Testament doctrines, served to support the Mormons’ firmly held, 
officially published belief that polygamy, so integral a part of their exercise 
of religion in Christian America, surely would be protected by the “divinely 
inspired”26 U.S. Constitution.  In the words of one Mormon publicist:
23
 Edwin B. Firmage, Religion and the Law: The Mormon Experience in the 
Nineteenth Century, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 765, 771 (1991).
24
 Actually, a relatively small percentage of the Mormon community entered into 
plural marriage.  See C. Peter Magrath, Chief Justice Waite and the ‘Twin Relic’: Reynolds 
v. United States, 18 VAND. L. REV. 507, 519, n.53 (1965).  Nonetheless, polygamy became 
a central doctrinal, social, and later political, issue for Mormons in the nineteenth century.  
Moreover, polygamy was practically significant because, as has been variously observed, 
“by and large, the polygamists were also the Mormons’ leaders.”  Hence the successful 
prosecution of polygamists “served to paralyze Mormon society by removing its 
leadership.”  See, e.g., Firmage, supra note 23, at 775.  An expanded version of Firmage’s 
analysis is presented in the first legal history of the Mormon experience, E. FIRMAGE AND 
R. MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830-1900 (1988).
25
 From a sworn statement made in 1874 by William Clayton, who had been private 
secretary to Joseph Smith and who had first transcribed Joseph Smith’s revelation on plural 
marriage. James L. Clayton, The Supreme Court, Polygamy and the Enforcement of Morals 
in Nineteenth-Century America: An Analysis of Reynolds v. United States, 7 DIALOGUE: A 
J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 46, 48, n.13 (Winter 1979).  See also BLOOM, supra note 21, at 
109.
26 See, e.g., Noel B. Reynolds, The Doctrine of an Inspired Constitution, in BY THE 
HANDS OF WISE MEN: ESSAYS ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1-28 (Ray C. Hillam, ed., 
1979). This anthology, comprised of essays by Mormon scholars and church leaders, 
explores the basic Mormon belief in the inspired nature of the U.S. Constitution.  It seems 
ironic that late twentieth-century Mormons would extol the inspired status of a national 
Constitution that had effectively been used against them a century earlier.  On the other 
hand, orthodox Mormons would maintain that, as expressed both by church president John 
Taylor in 1879, infra note 56, and by the contributors to the volume mentioned here, 
Mormons have always held great reverence for the U.S. Constitution, and that it is only the 
erroneous interpretation and application of that founding document to which they have 
objected at different moments in American history.  It complicates this issue further that 
the LDS Church has prohibited polygamy since the church officially ceased the practice in 
1890.  As I shall discuss in Part II of this article, while today’s Mormon church conducts 
itself strictly by that 1890 policy, such a straightforward, diplomatic position on polygamy 
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The constitution and laws of the United States being founded 
upon the principles of freedom, do not interfere with 
marriage relations, but leave the nation free to believe in and 
practice the doctrine of a plurality of wives, or to confine 
themselves to the one wife system, just as they choose.27
Despite the persecution that had driven them westward, the Mormons were 
confident that they could safely practice their religion in the Utah desert, 
where they could build and populate God’s kingdom.  
     American society, by and large, did not share this view.  Unlike the 
increasingly common present-day image of Mormons as honest, frugal, hard 
working, and prosperous (an image that most contemporary Mormons 
cultivate), many nineteenth-century Americans, like some today, perceived 
Mormons as a bizarre cult of religious fanatics who had rejected 
conventional Christianity to form an insular spiritual community based on 
an exclusive and ambitious theology.28  Mormons called themselves 
“Saints,” and non-believers, “Gentiles”;29 Mormons believed in modern-
day revelations, visiting angels and golden plates, and the possibility of 
eventual godhood; and, most sensational of all, Mormons practiced 
polygamy.
II. THE  NARRATIVE BATTLE OVER THE 
LEGITIMACY OF MORMON POLYGAMY
No Western nation is as religion-soaked as ours, where nine 
out of ten of us love God and are loved by him in return.  
That mutual passion centers our society and demands some 
understanding, if our doom-eager society is to be understood 
obscures a far more conflicted historical experience for the evolving nineteenth-century 
Mormon church during its roughly fifty-year polygamous period.
27
 Young, supra note 11, at 45-46.  See also Clayton, supra note 25, at 49.
28
 Magrath, supra note 24, at 514.
29
 In both doctrine (i.e., as God’s chosen people) and experience (i.e., persecution and 
exodus), Mormons identify with the Israelites of the Old Testament.   Mormons still 
occasionally refer to themselves as “Saints,” though rarely to non-Mormons as “Gentiles,” 
which would seem consistent with the end of persecution and the general Mormon trend 
toward assimilation of mainstream American social and cultural norms over the last 
hundred years.  See, e.g., Armand L. Mauss, Assimilation and Ambivalence: The Mormon 
Reaction to Americanization, 22 DIALOGUE: A J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 30 (Spring 1989); 
Martha S. Bradley, Changed Faces: The Official L.D.S. Position on Polygamy, 1890-1990, 
14 SUNSTONE: MORMON EXPERIENCE, SCHOLARSHIP, ISSUES, AND ART 26 (1990); How 
Mormons Cope with ‘Deterioration in Morals,’ U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, December 
19, 1977; GUSTIVE O. LARSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD (1971); 
Clayton, supra note 25, at 58; BLOOM, supra note 21, at 107, 256.
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at all.30
– Harold Bloom
Before discussing examples of nineteenth-century narratives of Mormon 
polygamy, I think it important to establish the theoretical framework in 
which I will “read” those narratives.  This calls for a brief discussion of the 
critical concepts that inform my analysis – narrative, reading, textuality, and 
rhetoric.  I will define and illustrate my understanding of these and related 
ideas in Sections A and B, after which I will devote Sections C and D to 
analyzing cultural and legal narratives of polygamy in nineteenth-century 
America.      
A. NARRATIVE, TEXTUALITY, AND 
“FUNDAMENTALIST” VERSUS “LITERARY” READING
The endless variety of definitions and uses of narrative – as a style, a 
trope, a theme, a discursive method – reflects the protean usefulness of 
narrative in human communication.  The philosopher and literary critic 
Roland Barthes has argued that every reader of a given narrative or text is 
necessarily a reader of countless layers of overlapping narratives or texts, 
just as every reader is also a writer and re-writer, through reading, of 
consequent, related texts.  In a seminal essay on the nature of narrative, 
Barthes articulates what Porter Abbott calls “[p]erhaps the fullest statement 
regarding the universality of narrative among humans”31:
The narratives of the world are numberless.  Narrative is first 
and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves 
distributed amongst different substances – as though any 
material were fit to receive man’s stories.  Able to be carried 
by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving 
images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these 
substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, 
novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, 
painting (think of Carpaccio’s Saint Ursula), stained-glass 
windows, cinema, comics, news items, conversation.  
Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, 
narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every 
society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there 
nowhere has been a people without narrative.  All classes, all 
human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is 
very often shared by men with different, even opposing, 
30 BLOOM, supra note 21, at 30.
31 H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 1 (2002).
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cultural backgrounds.  Caring nothing for the division 
between good and bad literature, narrative is international, 
transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life 
itself.32
Although Barthes’ definition emphasizes the innumerable forms that 
narrative takes, his catalogue is by no means exhaustive.  For example, later 
I will argue that legal argument is also a form of narrative, just as narrative, 
conversely, is a form of argument, in that all narrative has a purpose and 
works according to its own internal logic.33
Furthermore, the last two sentences of Barthes‘ passage, beyond merely 
anatomizing narrative as a ubiquitous meta-genre, identify the intrinsic 
mediating process of narrative – narrative’s continuous role in literally 
32
 Roland Barthes, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in A BARTHES 
READER 251-52 (Susan Sontag ed. 1982).
33
 The law does not work by pure formal logic, of course.  Rather, analogical and 
syllogistic reasoning, when skillfully used, are valuable rhetorical tools, appealing to the 
legal reader on emotional, ethical, and rational levels and thus enabling persuasion. Were 
the law purely logical, it would not differ from algebra; fact pattern X would always yield 
ruling Y – an ideal but not a reality in the American common law system, which is more 
precisely a highly structured rhetorical system.  Thus “logic” in the conventional sense is 
just one of many rhetorical tools used to persuade the legal reader of the validity of the 
argument being presented; the skillful legal writer might also invoke ideals such as 
consistency, objectivity, neutrality, precedent, tradition, and fairness.  Each of these tools 
or values contains its own narratives (e.g., “the law promises us fairness, so judges must 
square their decisions with some clear notion of what is fair”), and, conversely, the skillful 
deployment of one or several of these narratives makes a legal argument that much more 
“logical” and thus persuasive to the legal reader.  For an excellent practical discussion of 
the rhetorical nature of judicial opinions, see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and 
the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995).  Judge Wald
concludes her essay with a telling characterization of judges as rhetoricians, observing that 
within the structural constraints of the common law system,  
judges still use rhetoric to maneuver.  The way they present the facts, the 
way they describe rules and standards of review, the way they ‘handle‘ 
precedent, their decisions to write separately or stay with the pack, all 
provide wide avenues in which to drive the law forward.  A judge’s 
individual skill at working these levers of power, and doing so in a way 
that does not overly antagonize colleagues, continues to have a powerful 
influence on decision making.  That is why, in the end, judges – as well 
as their words – matter so much.  Id. at 1419.
The rhetorical realities of legal reasoning and discourse undermine the traditional 
assumption that law is only about reason and argument, not emotion.  For insightful 
interdisciplinary discussions of the complex relationship between reason and emotion, see
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 2000); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC 
JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL 
DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 85-124 (1987). 
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constituting, as well as organizing, the context in which we interpret, 
understand, and represent our lived experience.  Perhaps this is why the 
rhetorician Robert Scholes chooses to open Protocols of Reading, his 
discussion of reading as the quintessential human cognitive activity, with a 
statement from Barthes related to, but pithier than, that quoted above: “And 
no doubt that is what reading is: rewriting the text of the work within the 
text of our lives.”34  This lyrical, evocative epigraph about reading is itself a 
compact, implicit narrative (i.e., a narrative about narrative), for it contains 
at least several possible referents of a compelling story:  “reading,” 
“rewriting,” “the text,” “the work,” “our lives.”  To illustrate with a 
metaphor rooted in common experience, Barthes’ tightly packed little 
statement is like an icon on a computer desktop, which, if mouse-clicked, 
will spring open to display its parts (“reading,” “rewriting,” etc.), which 
themselves may be clicked open to reveal multiple meanings, which might 
contain further elements, and so on.  
Were we to click open Barthes’ sentence and proceed as described 
above, we would produce an expanded version, a story that, when “played 
out,” might go something like this: We are all readers, and we are always 
reading, however consciously.  This means that texts – let’s call the infinite 
universe of them “the textuality of things” – are always around us, 
inescapable, like water to fish.  But that is only part of the equation, 
because each time we read a text, we bring our own hermeneutical 
machinery – reflecting our education, values, preferences, memories, 
experiences, beliefs, feelings, convictions, commitments, ideologies – to 
bear, so that what was an “objective” external text is now our own unique 
version.  Thus we are authors (rewriters) at the same time (always) that we 
are readers; both inhere in the unending operation of reading.  This 
seamless cycle of reading-and-authoring is a simple yet profound way of 
explaining our interior experience of life and the world around us.  But 
what is “the work”?  This seems the most ambiguous and challenging 
aspect of this little story.  Is “the work” the original text, the template for 
all ensuing related texts, an ideal form in the Platonic sense?  (If that is so, 
are not all texts to some degree templates or rewritings of all other texts?  
Barthes’ statement, read in its totality, seems to suggest this.)  Is “the 
work” something transcendent and mysterious, ever present and intuitively 
palpable, but never fully comprehensible, requiring our faith, like Joseph 
Campbell’s notion of that yearned-for source of immanence to which we 
give the name “God”?35  Or is “the work” a necessary, instrumental, 
interpretive metaphor, a provisional marker for all signs, which are always 
“floating” somewhat due to the unanchored nature of signification itself?  
34 ROBERT SCHOLES, PROTOCOLS OF READING 1 (1989).
35 See, e.g., JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC DIMENSION: SELECTED ESSAYS 1959-
1987 156-79, 204-19 (1997).
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(Is this last understanding yet another way of saying that every reading is a 
rewriting?)
I have “read” at some length Barthes’ single observation on reading and 
textuality because I want to demonstrate at the outset of this article several 
crucial points of my definition of narrative, points that will serve as 
touchstones in the pages that follow.  It is worthwhile to discuss these 
points now, to establish more clearly what I mean by narrative and how I 
will use that definition. 
First, narrative is a resident dimension of all texts – of textuality – and is 
thus endemic to all human communication.36 As such, narrative functions to 
mediate how we understand and represent our experiences.  Abbott 
observes “the presence of narrative in almost all human discourse,” such 
that some theorists “place it next to language itself as the distinctive human 
trait.”37  Such theorists include Frederic Jameson, who has called narrative 
an “all-informing process” and “the central function or instance of the 
human mind,”38 and Jean-François Lyotard, who has described narrative as 
“the quintessential form of customary knowledge.”39 As these statements 
suggest, narrativity is at least roughly equivalent to textuality; we are 
always already both inside and outside innumerable narratives, a notion 
argued forcefully in literary and linguistic theory during the last several 
decades.  Yet to acknowledge the inescapable mediating presence of 
narrative is not to relinquish the goal of some kind of meaningful, 
principled understanding of narrative.40
36 See generally SCHOLES, supra note 34; THE CRAFTY READER (2001); ABBOTT, 
supra note 31.  For a probing discussion of the notion of textuality in relation to the law, 
see generally GOODRICH, supra note 33; see also STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND 
LEGAL STUDIES 37-47, 436-502 (1989); THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND 
IT’S A GOOD THING TOO (1993).   
37
 Abbott, supra note 31.
38 FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY 
SYMBOLIC ACT 13 (1981).
39 JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION 19 (Geoff Bennington & 
Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
40 In other words, just because language is “slippery” does not mean that we must give 
up hope of meaningful communication.  Rather, as readers, it behooves us to find 
interpretive methods and principles stable enough to provide traction as we navigate texts, 
especially given all of the intellectual log-rolling that characterizes postmodern thought.  
And the law, perhaps more than any other discipline, relies on at least the necessary fiction 
that words and their meanings remain relatively stable if we adhere to principled, consistent 
forms of reading and interpretation. Relativistim is not the same thing as nihilism; what 
matters is the quality of our choice and application of principles by which to read and 
interpret texts.  For a discussion of these issues in a focused legal context, see Pingree, 
supra note 15, at 808, n.3.  
A useful, concrete way to think about the rather ephemeral concepts of narrative and 
textuality is to consider the metaphorical quality of all language – metaphorical in the 
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In The Crafty Reader, Scholes presents a lucid, timely discussion of a 
principled methodology of reading in a chapter called “Sacred Reading: A 
Fundamental Problem.”  He situated his discussion in the context of 
contemporary religious and cultural debates among “fundamentalist” and 
“literary” readers.  Scholes makes these two terms opposite ends of the 
“reading“ spectrum and defines them in ways useful to my discussion here.  
He defines “fundamentalist“ readers as “literal“ readers – though the 
“concept of ‘literal meaning‘ is itself an exaggeration, a metaphor, a 
paradox.  Nevertheless, it [literal meaning] is an expression of the desire to 
get at the truth or meaning of a text.“41  Scholes defines “literary“ readers as 
those “attempting to situate the text and the writer of these letters in their 
own time, constructing, from the clues in the text, the persona of this writer, 
paying particular attention to his [the author’s] self-fashioning.“42  Scholes 
advocates the ideal of “crafty” reading, a kind of “selective literalism” that 
takes seriously the desire of “fundamentalist“ readers to get at the truth, 
while “resisting the [fundamentalist] zeal that often results in interpretive 
leaps to an unearned certainty of meaning.“43 Scholes resolves that “[t]he 
crafty reader must seek an authorial intention, while recognizing that there 
are many reasons why we shall never close the gap that separates us from 
the author.”44
The philosopher Richard Rorty praises “literary“ reading by suggesting 
that it enables us to participate in creating, rather than merely inheriting, the 
narratives of ourselves and our lives.  In an essay called “The Contingency 
of Selfhood,“  Rorty invokes Nietzsche’s thinking about the creation of self 
as a way to describe, quite poetically, a process of self-substantiation 
through narrative:
In his [Nietzsche’s] view, in achieving . . . self-
knowledge we are not coming to know a truth which was out 
there (or in here) all the time.  Rather, he saw self-knowledge 
as self-creation.  The process of coming to know oneself, 
sense that, as an ongoing part of life, we come to understand unfamiliar concepts or things 
when they are explained to us in terms of concepts or things that are familiar to us.  My 
mention of “mouse-clicking” Barthes‘ brief narrative to find its other meanings, and my 
equating people-and-textuality to fish-and-water, are two examples.  Those metaphors are 
effective to the readers of this article to the extent that those readers know something about 
computers and fish – an assumption I feel safe in making.  Hence the essence of metaphor 
is to communicate one thing in terms of something else – which, if one thinks about it, is 
the central cognitive process at work in any communication, however pedestrian.  For an 
excellent, common sense discussion of the metaphorical nature of language, see GEORGE 
LAKOFF AND MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). 
41 SCHOLES, supra note 36, at 219.
42 Id. at 238.
43 Id. at 219.
44 Id. at 230.
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confronting one’s contingency, tracking one’s causes home, 
is identical with the process of inventing a new language –
that is, of thinking up some new metaphors.  For any literal
description of one’s individuality, which is to say any use of 
an inherited language-game for this purpose, will necessarily 
fail.  One will not have traced that idiosyncrasy home but 
will merely have managed to see it as not idiosyncratic after 
all, as a specimen reiterating a type, a copy or replica of 
something which has already been identified.  To fail as a 
poet – and thus, for Nietzsche, to fail as a human being – is 
to accept somebody else’s description of oneself, to execute 
a previously prepared program, to write, at most, elegant 
variations on previously written poems.45
While using a somewhat different set of terms, Rorty is nonetheless 
concerned with how we respond to the mediating narratives of our lives –
literally, the inherited words, concepts, paradigms, histories, and ideologies 
that constitute the thinking-and-expressing medium of our experience.  
Rorty asserts that although none of us chooses the “hand we are dealt,“ our 
formative community or communities, each of us has the agency and power 
to determine how to “play our hand“ in original ways – how to achieve a 
meaningful degree of personal autonomy.  Indeed, Rorty contends that, in 
confronting the contingent forms of our own construction and ongoing 
mediation, we may achieve even more than a meaningful kind of self-
realization – an “owned” if inherited subjectivity; we may move toward 
genuine autonomy by actually undoing the inherited architecture of our 
subjectivity and rebuilding ourselves through narrative.  As he puts it, “the 
only way to trace home the causes of one’s being as one is would be to tell a 
story about one’s causes in a new language.”46
As if taking her cue from Scholes and Rorty, the philosopher Honi 
Fern Haber characterizes this “literary“ perspective on narrativity as a kind 
of enlightened compromise, a critical antidote to the kinds of dangerously 
“fundamentalist“ narratives that I will discuss later in this article:
There is no view from nowhere.  We can never leave all our 
prejudices behind and operate from a wholly disinterested 
standpoint, but our prejudices become dangerous only when 
they are dogmatic, kept hidden from view and not open to 
discussion. . . .  We cannot think or speak, much less act, in 
any purposeful manner without having structured our world 
45 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 27-28 (1989).
46 Id. at 28.
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and our interests in some heuristically useful way.  Without 
some notion of structure (unity) and some allowance for a 
legitimate recognition of similarities between ourselves and 
others, there can be no subject, community, language,
culture.47
In her own terms, Haber here engages two critical aspects of 
narrative and their implications for the paradox of autonomy and 
community: the impossibility of standing outside narrative 
textuality; the imperative of remaining mindful that rhetorical 
strategies of narrative, neutral in the abstract, will carry moral 
implications and political consequences when deployed in the 
service of living narrative; and the need to recognize our common 
values in order to reason together to navigate our differences as 
autonomous individuals.  Indeed, recognizing the impossibility of 
neutral narration, rather than undermining the credibility of the 
process or the narrator, actually frees its readers to consider more 
realistic, meaningful avenues of evaluation.  In contrast to the 
“literary“ methodologies of Scholes, Rorty, and Haber, of course, is 
the more common human tendency toward “fundamentalist“ 
narrative, which often produces a problem I will call “rhetorical 
reductivism.“   
B. THE “FUNDAMENTALIST“ PROBLEM OF “RHETORICAL REDUCTIVISM“ 
During the 1860 Congressional debate about Mormon polygamy, 
Congressman McClernand of Illinois laid down this warning:
As to polygamy, I charge it to be a crying evil; sapping not 
only the physical constitution of the people practicing it, 
dwarfing their physical proportions and emasculating their 
energies, but at the same time perverting the social virtues, 
and vitiating the morals of its victims. . . .  It is a scarlet 
whore.  It is a reproach to the Christian civilization; and 
deserves to be blotted out.48
Although this kind of righteous rhetoric was not uncommon in 
nineteenth-century America generally, it appears to have been especially 
typical of public feeling toward Mormons and their plural marriages.49 For 
47 HONI FERN HABER, BEYOND POSTMODERN POLITICS: LYOTARD, RORTY, FOUCAULT
1, 5 (1994) (emphasis added).
48 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1514 (1860).
49 See Magrath, supra note 24, at 514-20.  
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example, around the time of Congressman McClernand’s thunderous 
pronouncement, professor Frances Lieber, a leading figure in the 
development of American political science, denounced Mormonism as a 
“repulsive fraud” and a “wicked idea”;50 not long thereafter, a prominent 
clergyman in Chicago declared that “Mormonism ought to be 
dynamited”;51 and elsewhere, social commentators popularized the idea that 
the Mormon Church was a “society for the seduction of young virgins.”52
One critic announced that Salt Lake City was “the biggest whorehouse in 
the world.”53
The Mormons did not accept these public verdicts quietly.  In October 
1879, after Congress had acted to outlaw polygamy54 and the Supreme 
Court had upheld that law and ruled that the First Amendment did not 
protect plural marriage as an exercise of religion,55 Mormon Church 
President John Taylor aired this response in the Church’s general 
conference:
We might ask – will they derive any benefit from any course 
taken against the Latter-day Saints?  No!  A thousand times 
no!!  I tell you that the hand of God will be upon them for it . 
. . .  We do not want them to force upon us their drinking 
saloons, their drunkenness, their gambling, their debauchery 
and lasciviousness.  We do not want these adjuncts of 
civilization.56
Just as Congressman McClernand’s moralistic diatribe against Mormon 
polygamy was typical of contemporary public discourse on the issue, so 
President Taylor’s indignant and equally pious rebuke was characteristic of 
the Mormons’ style of return volley.  
Indeed, the Mormons, already wary of the federal government because 
of past conflict, had become increasingly antagonistic after Congress acted 
to proscribe polygamy in 1862.  Subsequently, Mormon spokesmen 
frequently portrayed the “non-Mormon world . . . as wicked, adulterous and 
corrupt.  Church members began to describe monogamy pejoratively as ‘the 
50 FRANCES LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 320 (2d ed. 1859).
51 See Magrath, supra note 24, at 514 (citing RAY B. WEST, JR., KINGDOM OF THE 
SAINTS 322 (1957)).
52 Id., note 24, at 515.
53 See IRVING WALLACE, THE TWENTY-SEVENTH WIFE 15 (1961), “a popular 
biography of Ann Eliza Young, the stormy and apostate twenty-seventh wife of Brigham 
Young.”  Magrath, supra note 24, at 515, n.41.
54
 The Morrill Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, sec. 1, 12 Stat. 501.
55 Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145.
56 JOHN TAYLOR, 20 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 316, 320-21 (1880).
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one-wife-system’ or ‘serial marriage’. . . .”57 John Taylor represented this 
increasingly strident outlook when, in the same 1879 sermon, and without a 
trace of irony, he claimed that working within the federal government were 
“religious fanatics and corrupt politicians” who “would not hesitate to 
sweep us off the face of the earth to get elected.”58  Then, appealing to the 
basic Mormon reverence for the Constitution,59 Taylor concluded that these 
politicians “care nothing about human rights, liberty, or life, if they can 
bring about the results desired.”60
Public statements concerning Mormon polygamy abounded in 
nineteenth-century America.  What stands out about them – indeed, what 
they nearly always shared, regardless of their source – was a zealous, 
polarized quality, an unyielding insistence on the exclusive moral rightness 
of their position.  Such stark representations of polygamy might seem 
inconsonant to anyone familiar with the convoluted history of plural 
marriage in America; since its inception with the Mormons in the nineteenth 
century, the American practice of polygamy has been, for those who have
lived it as for those who have studied it, a complex matter.  This was 
perhaps especially true for nineteenth-century Mormons, for whom 
polygamy, while a galvanizing, purportedly spiritual way of life, was also 
confusing, traumatic, and divisive.61
57
 Clayton, supra note 25, at 48. 
58
 Taylor, supra note 51, at 320.
59
 This basic Mormon belief in the inspired nature of the U.S. Constitution is explored 
in Reynolds, supra note 26 (Hillam, ed., 1979).
60
 Taylor, supra note 51, at 320.
61
 Accounts of life in Mormon polygamy range from the autobiographical to the 
fictional to the scholarly, and from the apologist to the excoriating to the satirical.  See, 
e.g., Martha Sonntag Bradley & Mary Brown Firmage Woodward, Plurality, Patriarchy, 
and the Priestess: Zina D.H. Young’s Nauvoo Marriages, 20 J. OF MORMON HIST. 84 
(Spring 1994); JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE 
PRINCIPLE (1987); Kahlile Mehr, Women’s Response to Plural Marriage, 18 DIALOGUE: A 
J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 84 (Fall 1985); VALEEN TIPPETTS AVERY AND LINDA KING 
NEWELL, MORMON ENIGMA: EMMA HALE SMITH: PROPHET’S WIFE, “ELECT LADY,” 
POLYGAMY’S FOE, (1984); Julie Dunfey, ‘Living the Principle’ of Plural Marriage: 
Mormon Women, Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, 10 FEMINIST 
STUDIES 523 (Fall 1984); ORSON SCOTT CARD, FATHER, MOTHER, MOTHER, AND MOM 
AND A WOMAN OF DESTINY (1984); Bushman, ed., supra note 1, see especially Stephanie 
Smith Goodson, Plural Wives, Judith Rasmussen Dushku, Feminists, and Laurel Thatcher 
Ulrich, Fictional Sisters; MAURINE WHIPPLE, THE GIANT JOSHUA (1976); SAMUEL 
WOOLLEY TAYLOR, FAMILY KINGDOM (1974) and I HAVE SIX WIVES: A TRUE STORY OF 
PRESENT-DAY PLURAL MARRIAGE (1956); PAUL BAILEY, POLYGAMY WAS BETTER THAN 
MONOTONY: ONE MAN’S MEMORIES OF MORMON PIONEER LIFE IN UTAH (1972); 
STENHOUSE, supra note 10, and EXPOSE OF POLYGAMY IN UTAH: A LADY’S LIFE AMONG 
THE MORMONS (1872); MRS. JENNIE A. FROISETH, THE WOMEN OF MORMONISM, OR THE 
STORY OF POLYGAMY AS TOLD BY THE VICTIMS THEMSELVES (1887); JENNIE A. 
BARTLETT, ELDER NORTHFIELD’S HOME; OR SACRIFICED ON THE MORMON ALTAR, A 
STORY OF THE BLIGHTING CURSE OF POLYGAMY (1883); ANN ELIZA YOUNG, WIFE #19, A 
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The experiential complexity of polygamy is precisely what I will 
emphasize in this section, contrasting the recorded reality of this unwieldy 
social phenomenon with the moralistic, simplifying perspectives that fueled 
a fierce narrative battle between the Mormons, on the one hand, and the 
U.S. government and much of the American public, on the other.  In this 
narrative battle, each side tended to present argument-narratives of the other 
that invoked grand ideologies and thus obscured the nuanced reality of the 
experience, further polarizing the public debate by narrowing the scope of 
possible meanings about life in polygamy.  
In particular, I want to consider the function and implications of this 
kind of narrative process, in which each side sought legitimacy for its vision 
of American religious identity by representing polygamy in morally 
simplistic terms and images for purposes of gaining ethical leverage in the 
ongoing public dialectic.  How, and why, did this sort of fundamentalist 
narrative process – an example of rhetorical reductivism – succeed in 
producing the predominant American moral narrative about polygamy?  Of 
course, all representations – all narratives – inevitably reduce their subject 
matter in the sense that narratives must impose some kind of order on the 
unruliness of experience, with language always an approximation of what is 
intended.62  Thus I am talking about a matter of degree in my discussion of 
the kind of narrative produced by rhetorical reductivism.  Still, because this 
kind of overweening, two-dimensional narrative tends to be common and 
influential as an element of public discourse, I think it worth examining as 
part of my analysis of narrative and the desire for cultural legitimacy.  Why 
did partisans in the public debate over polygamy depict so complex a 
cultural and religious phenomenon in such singular, imperious moral terms?  
How did the innumerable authors of these dueling narratives, all invoking, 
to some degree, the institutional voices of God and state, effectively divest 
the experience of polygamy of any moral ambiguity?  More generally, how 
might we explain the collective impulse to deploy rhetorical reductivism in 
representing socially divisive issues so as to maintain an established moral 
order, often at remarkable intellectual cost?    
Of course, unyielding language such as that used by Congressman 
McClernand or church President Taylor often has characterized public, 
official, and institutional representations of nettlesome social issues in 
American life.  In fact, once we account for a century’s worth of linguistic 
LIFE IN BONDAGE, A FULL EXPOSE OF MORMONISM (1875); MARIA WARD, FEMALE LIFE 
AMONG THE MORMONS: A NARRATIVE OF MANY YEARS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, BY THE 
WIFE OF A MORMON ELDER, RECENTLY FROM UTAH (1855).
62 This does not contradict the notion of textuality; to be inescapably inside the 
medium of language does not preclude the equally inescapable, ongoing necessity of 
forging, for external (e.g., social, political, legal, cultural) purposes, meaningful 
communication within that medium – something like the need to continually repair and 
orient one’s sailboat while sailing in various weather conditions.
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shift, we might find it difficult to distinguish the bellicose statements I have 
quoted from the holy rhetoric we are served today on controversial public 
issues – abortion, drugs, pornography, affirmative action, and 
homosexuality, to name a few.  But often such grandiose language is, to risk 
an oxymoron, grandly reductive, invoking sweeping authority to preempt 
doubt or, as Scholes asserts, to conceal conflict or disagreement.  In these 
ways rhetorical reductivism prevents meaningful public discussion, for it 
blinds us to the ethical and experiential complexity of a social practice like 
polygamy. 
Still, we should not be surprised that such binary rhetoric mediates 
public accounts of controversial social issues; perhaps just this kind of 
simplification is necessary to repress or otherwise manage – to order in an 
acceptable way – the public and personal anxiety that attends controversial 
issues.  Indeed, I suggest that righteous, simplistic public responses to 
controversial issues are tokens of anxiety, signs of an underlying 
ambivalence that emerges when we are forced to consider difficult 
questions about who we are, individually and collectively.63
63 Regarding the markedly divisive effects (including the rhetorical reductivism I posit 
here) that certain matters of social controversy tend to produce, sociologist Jerome 
Skolnick offers a useful theory of how people process controversial social issues. Jerome 
H. Skolnick, The Social Transformation of Vice, 51 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 9 
(Winter 1988).  Skolnick has long studied behavior that mainstream society views as “vice” 
– gambling, drugs, adultery, and prostitution, for example.  Id. at 10.  He suggests that 
public controversy about such issues stems from our moral ambivalence towards them, so 
that vice is not merely or exclusively “evil or immoral” behavior, but rather conduct that 
connotes “pleasure and popularity, as well as wickedness.”  Id.  Hence the claim about 
moral ambivalence, for vice “is conduct that a person may enjoy and deplore at the same 
time.”  Id.  This theory of vice offers interesting possibilities for our analysis of narratives 
about the Mormon polygamy controversy.  
For example, given that Mormon polygamy was genuinely controversial in nineteenth-
century America, we may read rhetorically reductive responses to polygamy as a possible 
indication of dividedness and uncertainty, not only within those who criticized polygamy, 
but also within those who engaged in it.  Indeed, this view of social behavior enables us 
meaningfully to critique what we might think of as a whole dialectic of vice about Mormon 
polygamy – that is, engagement by someone in the practice of polygamy, public reactions 
against that engagement, counter-response and justification, and so on.  In a sense, this 
broad, open-ended notion of vice helps us address the very problem at issue here –
simplistic, two-dimensional analysis – as we work to understand the meaning of reductive 
representations of social controversy, for it allows us to view mainstream definitions of 
vice, not merely as straightforward (i.e., literal-fundamentalist) statements of political 
affiliation or identity, but also, in Skolnick’s term, as a sign of deeper “cultural 
contradiction.” Id. at 11.  
This may seem just an academic version of the self-fulfilling cliché “me thinks thou 
dost protest too strongly,” or “homophobia conceals a latent homosexual desire.”  Yet it 
seems indisputable that these worn maxims carry a kernel of truth about why people tend to 
feel unusually strongly about certain issues.  How else to explain a fierce attack on a 
relatively unknown other, unless we at least recognize that the speaker gives a damn one 
way or another?  Polygamy mattered, for good or ill, to those who engaged so extensively 
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C.  CULTURAL NARRATIVES OF MORMON POLYGAMY 
Polygamy was repugnant to mainstream American values regarding the 
configuration and politics of marriage,64 and public response was fierce.  In 
1856, for instance, the first Republican Party platform proclaimed “both the 
right and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those 
twin relics of barbarism – Polygamy and Slavery.65 This statement reflected 
the common fear that polygamy, like slavery, would spread to the 
territories.  Polygamy had spread to the Utah territory, of course, but 
perhaps more interesting for our purposes here is that some Americans 
linked the narrative of polygamy with that of slavery, equating the 
ostensibly consensual practice of the former with the undeniably coercive 
practice of the latter.  Novelist and social activist Harriet Beecher Stowe 
spoke for many who viewed plural marriage as anything but consensual; 
polygamy was merely a different kind of “degrading bondage, . . . a cruel 
slavery whose chains have cut into the very hearts of thousands of our 
sisters.”66 And Jennie Froiseth, the well known author of The Women of 
Mormonism, or the Story of Polygamy as Told by the Victims Themselves, 
declared that “[t]he cornerstone of  polygamy is the degradation of woman, 
and it can flourish only where she is regarded and treated as a slave.”67
In the face of this harsh public narrative of Mormon polygamy as 
women’s serfdom, the Church dug in its heels, repeating its institutional 
narrative about the role of women through a series of official statements 
that did nothing to refute the public impression that Mormon wives, 
polygamous or otherwise, lived in servitude to their husbands.  On the 
contrary, the Church seemed bent on reinforcing the general Victorian 
in excoriating or exalting it, and the evidence is in the telling.  
Skolnick’s theory is also helpful to us if we want to understand the dynamic 
relationship between vice and culture – between what is publicly represented and what is 
personally felt and experienced – because the theory gives us one principled way to read 
narratives about polygamy in more of a literary, rather than a literal-fundamentalist, mode.  
That is, Skolnick’s interest in searching for signs of “cultural contradiction” is precisely to 
emphasize the possible ambiguity of the subtext – to look beyond cleanly drawn lines of 
simplistic moral representation to the underlying complexity of a controversial social 
practice and its intricate relations to history, circumstance, ideology and will.  
64 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 253-60 (1992).  In an incisive 
commentary, Posner suggests that polygamy threatened the ideal of “companionate” 
marriage that anchors western notions of monogamy.
65 PORTER AND JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1960 27 (1961).  This 
hard line on polygamy appeared again in the Party’s 1876 platform, and in 1880 the 
Republicans called for the elimination of polygamy and, if necessary, the militarily 
enforced separation of “the political power from the ecclesiastical power of the so-called 
Mormon church.”  Id.
66
 Stenhouse, supra note 10, at vi.
67
 Sheldon, supra note 11, at 121 (quoting Young,  supra note 11, at 11).
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narrative of women as subject to male authority.  For example, in 1852, at 
the behest of Brigham Young, Church Apostle Orson Pratt prepared 
“Celestial Marriage,” a lengthy defense of polygamy that coincided with the 
Church’s 1852 public announcement of plural marriage. Pratt, probably the 
Church’s chief apologist for polygamy, characterized the woman’s place in 
the family in distinctly Pauline terms:
The husband is the head of the family, and it is his duty to 
govern his wife or wives, and the children, according to the 
laws of righteousness; and it is the duty of the wife to be 
subject unto him in all things, even as the church is subject 
unto Christ.68
That such patriarchal pronouncements echoed the familiar New Testament 
metaphor of Christ’s church as a “body” seems to have been an attempt at 
theological justification of polygamy through the invocation of a well-
known, orthodox Christian image – one in which patriarchal order was 
unobjectionable.  
Yet the Mormons’ expansion of the well-known narrative of Christ’s 
church “body” to include polygamy offended mainstream Christians, much 
as, in principle, the attempt to include same-sex unions within the grand 
narrative of traditional marriage would offend many Americans more than a 
century later.  Indeed, the Mormons’ revised narrative of the patriarchal 
family order undoubtedly contributed to the popular notion that Mormons, 
regardless of their theological justifications, had constructed their 
polygamous system to imitate “the Oriental concubines, in which the 
women were near-slaves.”69  Clearly, the public embrace of Paul’s “body of 
Christ” narrative did not also yield acceptance of the radical departure from 
convention that polygamy represented.  Joseph Singer has observed that the 
persuasion process turns on whether the speaker succeeds in compelling the 
audience to recognize or discover common ground (e.g., shared values) with  
a person or position that the audience initially does not support.70  This  
conception of persuasion has its limits, however: the nineteenth-century 
American public’s “discovery” or “recognition” of values already held 
about marriage decidedly did not lead many to accept the argument, implicit 
in the Mormons’ narrative of Christ’s body, that a significant deviation 
from monogamy was legitimate, even if rooted in selective Old Testament 
precedent.
68
 Young, supra note 56, at 50.
69
 Magrath, supra note 24, at 518.
70 Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442, 2444 (1989).  See also
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1002-04 (1991).
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This particular clash of narratives is worth considering a little further, as 
it raises an important point about cultural legitimacy.  Generally speaking, 
the public read Mormon polygamy within a narrative of slavery; that is, 
people generally were persuaded that Mormon plural marriage fettered and 
devalued women in ways sufficiently analogous to how slavery fettered and 
devalued black Americans that the slavery narrative should include 
polygamy as well as the southern institution of owning and using black 
people as property.  The Mormons, on the other hand, read their practice of 
polygamy as divinely inspired, part of several otherwise legitimate 
nineteenth-century American narratives: the narrative of reverence for the 
prophets of the Old Testament, some of whom had had plural wives; the 
narrative of devotion to the Apostle Paul’s patriarchal New Testament 
teachings that made women subservient to men; and the narrative that the 
Constitution, divinely inspired, protected distinct religious practices like 
polygamy, themselves inspired by God.     
Each set of narratives served to legitimize the cultural identity of its 
proponents, which in this situation amounted to being obedient to the 
expressed doctrines of the Christian God, and thus legitimate in the eyes of 
that God.  Such a starkly binary clash of narratives, often both the source 
and the product of rhetorical reductivism, meant a zero sum game as to 
legitimacy in the eyes of one or the other audience (Mormon or American 
public).  That is, narrative that seeks to legitimize the cultural identity – and 
thus the worldview – of the speaker often serves, just as effectively, to de-
legitimize the cultural identity of the “other” in the narrative battle.   This 
should not be surprising; these binary functions are typically inseparable, 
flip sides of the same coin:  a narrative that undermines the cultural 
legitimacy of a certain person or group will almost certainly have the effect, 
whether intended by a specific author or communicated as a more diffuse 
cultural sensibility, of legitimizing the position of the author.  
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of “zero sum” legitimacy will operate 
roughly to the extent that the narratives in conflict are literal-
fundamentalist, binary narratives, leaving little room for hermeneutic 
negotiation.  And although this need not be the case when narratives clash, 
it seems that the greater the perceived religious stakes, the greater the 
human tendency to batten down the rhetorical hatches to ensure a sense of 
certainty and legitimacy, even if (or, in Scholes’ view, especially if)71 that 
rhetorical strategy expresses itself in the cloak of highly figurative 
language.    
Some Mormon plural wives would likely have disputed the typically 
categorical characterizations of their polygamous lifestyle, for most of their 
first-hand accounts suggest that the experience of polygamy was 
71
 Scholes, supra note 36 at 13.
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heterogeneous.72 Historian Kahlile Mehr concludes his detailed survey of 
such women’s personal narratives with this observation: 
Plural marriage was a complex phenomenon in both 
theology and practice.  It was no less complex 
psychologically.  Some LDS women ardently accepted it as a 
divine principle.  Others viewed it as an unwelcome but 
necessary sacrifice to achieve salvation.  A few loathed it.  
There were women who coaxed reluctant husbands to take 
an additional wife.  Others quietly acquiesced--either in 
initial discussions or when presented with a fait accompli, 
and still others left the household rather than accept a sister 
wife.  Sometimes the inner and outer persons were in 
conflict.  Inwardly repelled and outwardly obedient, many 
women faced a struggle that for some led to triumphant self-
control and for others to shattering disillusionment.73
Notwithstanding the rhetorical reductivism at work in most public 
narratives about polygamy, the experience itself, like any experience 
involving intimate social relationships, did not lend itself to transparent or 
uniform interpretation at either a personal or a symbolic level.
Still, many Americans derived their impression of Mormon polygamy 
almost exclusively from the nightmarish personal narratives published in 
popular books like Jennie Bartlett’s Elder Northfield’s Home; or Sacrificed 
on the Mormon Altar, A Story of the Blighting Curse of Polygamy.74 The 
New York Times also contributed significantly to this national impression, 
consistently inveighing against Mormons and polygamy.  In 1882, for 
example, after The World had published a benign report on the Mormons, 
the Times reprinted the article, followed by the demand, “What can [the 
editor’s] object be in making his paper the apologist for a false and 
degrading religion?”75 According to the Times, the editor of the World must 
have been angling to provide himself “with as many wives as he now holds 
shares of stock.”76  A year later, after many Protestant churches had 
organized mass meetings in most large American cities to draft resolutions 
urging Congress to take further action against the Mormons, The Times’ 
editorial page seemed to relish the chance to point a finger at the Mormons, 
72 See, e.g., Goodson, supra note 61, at 95-99; Dushku, supra note 1, at 177-97; 
Bradley and Woodward, supra, note 61, at 111-118; BAILEY, supra note 61 at 33-37; Mehr, 
supra note 61, at 84-88.  See generally WHIPPLE, supra note 61; AVERY and NEWELL, 
supra note 61.
73
 Mehr, supra note 61, at 84.  
74 Id. at 117, n.14; 121.
75 Id. at 120, n.25, citing The New York Times, June 13, 1882.
76 Id., note 26.
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calling them “a class of sinners . . . providentially supplied for the purpose 
of enabling eloquent ministers to preach powerful sermons without 
offending any possible pewholder.”77
Editorial page hyperbole aside, it says much about public sentiment that 
The New York Times, arguably the national journalistic voice of record, felt 
confident speaking for “any possible pewholder” in presenting a narrative 
of Mormons as so immoral that God must have produced them to give all 
other Christians a reason to unite in opposition.  To use William Handley’s 
phrase about growing up Mormon,78 the Times’ characterization signifies a 
“totalizing narrative” among Americans regarding the Mormons, one in 
which, morally speaking, there appeared to be no middle ground.
Such sweeping condemnations of polygamy, like the Church’s dogmatic 
pronouncements, created a morally stark dialectic of public narratives that 
could only have obscured the complex nature of the polygamous 
experience, especially for the Mormon women asked to embrace it.  
Thoughtful voices were few, but notable.    For example, John Stuart Mill, 
perhaps annoyed with the sheer volume of ridicule applied to Mormon 
polygamists, or alert to the hypocrisy of a larger culture blind to its own 
conventional forms of misogyny and marital inequality, called for a more 
careful approach to the Mormon question.  Marveling at “the language of 
downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country 
whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of 
Mormonism,” Mill argued a kind of “pro-choice” position on the issue of 
plural marriage:
It must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary 
on the part of the women concerned in it . . . as is the case 
with any other form of marriage institution. . . .  I cannot 
admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to 
step in and require that a condition of things with which all 
who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be 
put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some 
thousands of miles distant who have no part or concern in 
it.79
From our vantage point, Mill’s position may seem somewhat archaic, even 
gratuitous.  That is, whether Mormon women were making a genuinely 
voluntary choice in accepting plural marriages now seems highly debatable 
77 Id. at118, n.16, citing The N. Y. Times, October 9, 1883.
78 WILLIAM R. HANDLEY, “MORMONISM AND OTHER NARRATIVES OF THE LIVING 
DEAD,” ONE NATION UINDER GOD? RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 240-43 (Marjorie 
Garber & Rebecca L. Walkowitz, eds. 1999).
79 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 92-94 (1947).
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in the glare of the post-modern universe, where the idea of the autonomous 
will of the liberal subject, and the machinery of individual consent, have 
been considered increasingly problematic.80 Yet Mill, for one, was 
consistent on the question of gender equality, having published writings that 
opposed sex discrimination, including the sex discrimination of nineteenth-
century marriage laws.81
Moreover, to fairly evaluate the nineteenth-century Mormon 
woman’s choice to accept plural marriage, we must consider the difficult 
and complex implications of that choice in historical context.82  Martha 
Bradley and Mary Woodward have pointed out that for nineteenth-century 
Mormon women, choosing to believe in the divine calling of Joseph Smith 
was itself a kind of threshold paradigm choice of epistemological 
significance, which narrowed ensuing practical decisions.  In this sense, 
polygamy was another version of the classic narrative of faith versus 
reason: 
A feminist interpretation of . . . plural marriage sees that, 
although women were willing to restructure their lives along 
new and often radical lines, they believed Joseph Smith was 
expressing the will of God by recreating patriarchal 
precedents from the Bible.  Mormon patriarchy reflected his 
attempt to redefine, reorder, and maintain social control 
through male priesthood.  He did this by invoking the moral 
authority of revelation, priesthood power, and the principle 
of obedience.  We must not underestimate the impact of 
80
 See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 635, 
636 (1983); Anne Kasper, Consciousness Re-evaluated: Interpretive Theory and Feminist 
Scholarship, 56 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 30, (1986).
81 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869).
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 Literary and religious scholar Paul Ricoeur argues that such contextualization 
requires that we consider also the terms of the spiritual narrative by which such women 
were living their lives:
[F]or a philosophical inquiry, a religious faith may be identified through 
its language, or, to speak more accurately, as a kind of discourse.  This . . 
. contention does not say that language, that linguistic expression, is the 
only dimension of the religious phenomenon; nothing is said – either pro 
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PAUL RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED 35 (1995).
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Smith’s prologue of visions and angels in his private 
instructions to young women.  If they believed, the logical 
consequence was their total submission to his judgment, his 
authority, and his power.  If they did not believe this, there 
was no way for them to remain members of his church.83
Bradley and Woodward further observe that for nineteenth-century 
American women generally, marriage was a categorical decision of 
inestimable impact, “the first moment in their adult lives when they were 
empowered.  Choosing to marry or not to marry, and whom to marry, 
radically changed the boundaries of their lives.”84
Given the dramatic nature of the marriage decision, it becomes 
comprehensible that a woman might have entered plural marriage out of 
what anthropologist Rex Cooper has called “a real fear for survival.”85
Indeed, if a woman came to invest her belief in what she felt was the 
grandeur of Mormon theology, accepting polygamy “might be regarded as 
an attempt to maintain Mormon group identity and provide for Mormon 
salvation despite any eventuality.”86  Were these women sophisticated 
enough to be “tracing their own causes home,”87 or were they making life-
altering choices heavily mediated by their belief in Joseph Smith’s narrative 
of sacrifice and salvation?  Although the latter seems the more likely 
scenario, the sheer novelty of plural marriage for most of these women 
suggests that there was, at least for some, something of “telling a story 
about one’s causes in a new language” – that is, in the radical choice to 
83
 Bradley and Woodward, supra notes 29 and 61, at 116.  Lucy W. Kimball’s account 
of being proposed to by Joseph Smith himself is telling:
When the Prophet Joseph Smith first mentioned the principle of plural 
marriage to me I became very indignant, and told him emphatically that I 
did not wish him ever to mention it to me again, as my feelings and 
education revolted against any thing of such a nature.  He counseled me, 
however, to pray to the Lord for light and understanding . . . [and] after I 
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and composed; a feeling of happiness took possession of me, and at the 
same time I received a powerful and irresistible testimony of the truth of 
plural marriage, which testimony has abided with me ever since. 
Goodson, supra note 61, at 91 (citing THE HISTORICAL RECORD 6:229-30 (1887)).
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 Bradley and Woodward, supra notes 29 and 61, at 114.
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accept life as a plural wife.
Of course, the clash of narratives never ceases.  For instance, somewhat 
ironically, some Mormon women also linked these concerns about survival 
and identity to what they viewed as a larger, more progressive sensibility 
about their religion: “[w]hen they chose to enter a patriarchal religious 
community, they did so because they believed that the gender system was 
organized around family-centered and woman-oriented values.  The 
network of familial relationships created through plural marriage created a 
new and unique sense of community, of family and of self.”88  From this 
perspective, many Mormon women saw polygamy as “a new social 
institution that they were able to accept by redefining it in terms of a female 
world view.”89
These progressive images of self and community reflect more a 
narrative of nineteenth-century American utopian yearning than they do the 
predominant nineteenth-century Christian narrative of patriarchal order.  
And despite the obvious contextual differences, such images seem similar to 
what Catherine MacKinnon has suggested is the Sisyphean narrative of 
feminist methodology – to make possible the “expression of women’s 
situation, in which the struggle for consciousness is a struggle for world: for 
a sexuality, a history, a culture, a community, a form of power, an 
experience of the sacred.”90
Some Mormon women chose ways to experience the polygamy 
narrative as one that enabled expanded identity and self-empowerment; as 
discussed at the opening of this article, such women engaged in a surprising 
political activism that made patriarchal Church declarations seem 
incongruous with these women’s real experiences and opinions.  For 
example, Mormon women organized the successful campaign for suffrage 
in Utah, which left anti-Mormon critics perplexed as to “why the ‘last 
outpost of barbarism’ should have extended the vote to women in 1870, 
fifty years before the nation adopted the Nineteenth Amendment and 
decades before women’s suffrage had acquired respectability elsewhere.”91
As discussed in the opening of this article, some Mormon women also 
published the Woman’s Exponent,92 a journal that was decidedly outspoken 
on political and social matters of the day.  One editorial said this of the 
relative importance of men in women’s lives:
Is there then nothing worth living for, but to be petted, 
88
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89 Id. at 112.
90 MACKINNON, supra note 80, at 636.
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humored, and caressed, by a man?  That is all very well as 
far as it goes, but that man is the only thing in existence 
worth living for I fail to see. . . .  And when men see that 
women can exist without their being constantly at hand, that 
they can learn to be self-reliant or depend upon each other 
for more or less happiness, it will perhaps take a little of the 
conceit out of some of them.93
The idea of depending “upon each other for more or less happiness” makes 
sense within the “empowerment” narrative of plural marriage when one 
considers the significant personal implications of plural marriage for a 
Mormon woman:
. . . the practical requirements of living as plural wives 
challenged the limiting stereotype of women accepted by 
civilized America. A plural wife could not be the helpless, 
fainting, protected female or she would likely faint alone.  
Plural wives often had to look to themselves rather than their 
husbands for financial support and physical labor.  For 
practical purposes many were more like widows than 
traditional wives.  The regular absence of their husbands 
simplified  their housekeeping chores, allowing them to 
participate in a broader range of activities than their eastern 
sisters.  In one of the neatest ironic contradictions of the 
period, the “enslaved harems” of Utah produced some of 
America’s most efficient early feminists.94
From these accounts, it is difficult not to see something of a cultural 
anomaly in the complex experience of Mormon polygamous women, 
notwithstanding simplistic public narratives coming from both the Church 
and its critics.  
Still, I am mindful that in suggesting another cultural narrative for 
Mormon polygamy (an “empowerment narrative,” coexistent with the 
dialectical “women-in-bondage“ and “spiritual superiority“ narratives 
championed by many critics and proponents of polygamy), I am relying on 
a current historical narrative constructed by present-day Mormon feminist 
scholars.  I point this out because of the importance, in doing “literary”95
reading, of candidly “tracing the causes of one’s own narrative,”96 as it 
93
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were.  I believe this approach enriches “literary” and avoids 
“fundamentalist” reading, because it acknowledges the real ambiguities that 
reside in a given narrative.  
Here, for example, the motives and values of the contemporary women 
writing the nineteenth-century polygamy “empowerment narrative” are 
quite possibly diverse and conflicted: being women, scholars, and Mormons 
themselves might encourage any number of “empowerment” and “bondage” 
feelings about their early Mormon counterparts, depending on the writers’ 
intellectual values, historical methodologies, identity politics, personal 
relationships to the Mormon Church, and so on.  To read the experience of 
Mormon plural wives with a fundamentalist sensibility, on the other hand, 
would yield a more ideologically beholden, homogenous, and settled 
narrative – one more likely to conceal, however unwittingly, uncertain facts 
and attitudes that do not cleanly square with the overarching, mediating 
narrative being expounded.         
Whatever our assessment of this contemporary “empowerment“  
narrative of nineteenth-century polygamy, it is clear that some of the 
women who experienced that life forged and lived by this “empowerment” 
narrative.  Of course, this may have been the most meaningful alternative 
for women who were typically strong and educated, and often well beyond 
their teenage years.97  Perhaps there is something apologist about the 
“empowerment“ narrative being told by these current Mormon scholars.  
Yet is it not human nature (especially among the religious) to seek or create 
narratives that justify one’s self, family, or community?  This alone is not 
fatal to good reading; rather, it would seem to be an inevitable aspect of 
self-narration.  Haber eloquently reminds us of what is truly indispensable 
to the literary reader – recognizing that “there is no view from nowhere,” 
that where our reading and writing energies actually matter is in remaining 
vigilant and honest about our mediating backgrounds and convictions.
Thus there is no shame, nor need their be harm, in recognizing, if indeed 
we see them, meaning and value in past and present “empowerment” and 
“bondage” narratives of women in polygamy.  I see much value, for 
example, in the “empowerment” narrative constructed by late twentieth-
century Mormon feminist historians, if only because their research and 
writing about the complexity of a woman’s polygamy experience produces 
a literary counter-narrative to the generally sanitized, fundamentalist, 
“unknowing”98 narrative of polygamy maintained by today’s mainstream 
97 See, e.g., Jill C. Mulvay, Zion’s Schoolmarms, in Bushman, ed., supra note 1.
98 BLOOM, supra note 21.  Bloom suggests that, ultimately, the “American Religion” 
may not be any sect or faith so much as a narrow, settled, habit of mind, an unwillingness 
to know ourselves honestly and thus an incomprehension as to our spiritual identity – all, 
ironically, the product of our dogged determination to “know“ things with reassuring 
certainty more than with nuanced understanding.  As Bloom’s laments: “the American 
Religion, which is nothing if not a knowing, does not know itself.  Perhaps this is a 
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LDS Church.99  And in the end, the clash of polygamy narratives across
time opens a door to more interpretive possibilities still, as well as a 
glimpse of the endless, trans-historical, trans-cultural nature of narrativity.100
Mormon polygamy was not unique as an occasion in which the 
complexity of women’s experience was appropriated by dominant moral 
narratives of a patriarchal culture.  By any account, that has been going on 
since the beginning.  But polygamy forced an unusually excruciating 
decision on the women asked to practice it, a decision whose complexity 
was seldom if ever acknowledged in the rhetorical battles waged on the 
stage of public morality. As Claudia Bushman has described it:
For the women of Zion the importance of polygamy cannot 
be overstressed, even though only a small proportion of the 
permanent and general American irony. . . ; we may be uniquely the nation where the 
knowers cannot know themselves.” Id. at 263-4.
99 The official LDS Church position on historical scholarship, particularly regarding 
the controversial experience of polygamy, resides on the “literal-fundamentalist“ side of 
the reading and narrative spectrum.  Scholes could well be referring to the perspective of 
today‘s mainstream LDS Church as to its own past when he observes that “fundamentalist 
reading is always marked by shifts from the literal to the figurative – as a way of 
concealing conflicts.” SCHOLES, supra note 36, at 231.  Because the history of Mormonism 
is effectively a history of conflicts, there is much to conceal.  Indeed, because the 
mainstream Mormon church has devoted itself to, and achieved, a remarkable assimilation 
into mainstream American culture over the last century, see Mauss, supra note 29, there is 
no shortage of motives for the church to address its own history with a fierce commitment 
to an apologist kind of literalism characteristic of fundamentalist reading.  
Thus, for example, Mormon orthodoxy requires a strict reading of the peculiar and 
astonishing facts of Joseph Smith’s visions and revelations (including the conspicuous fact 
that the gold plates from which Smith translated the Book of Mormon were promptly taken 
from the earth by the angel Moroni).  Yet regarding polygamy, which, as discussed in Part 
I, was central to Smith’s vision of Christ’s true “latter-day” church and was the defining 
ordeal for nineteenth-century Mormons, the contemporary church waxes so figurative as to 
be virtually unresponsive to serious historical inquiry, whether from external critics or its 
own members.  See HANDLEY, supra note 78, at 240-43; see generally THE NEW MORMON 
HISTORY: REVISIONIST ESSAYS ON THE PAST (D. Michael Quinn, ed. 1992); QUINN, THE 
MORMON HIERARCHY: EXTENSIONS OF POWER (1997); JAN SHIPPS, MORMONISM: THE 
STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS TRADITION (1987); BLOOM, supra note 21, at 77-128 (1992).  
Quinn, formerly an LDS church member in good standing and a history professor at the 
church’s Brigham Young University, was excommunicated from the church in 1993 for his 
scholarly interrogations of sensitive aspects of Mormon history and doctrine, including 
polygamy.  
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populace was directly involved.  The Mormon sisters were 
required to defend the Principle or leave the Church entirely.  
They had to make plural marriage work to prove they were 
right.  The Principle, more than anything else, set up a 
competition between the Mormons and the Gentiles, the first 
intent on proving their righteousness and the second on 
forcing the miscreant group to recant their evil ways. 101
These conditions likely guaranteed that, among nineteenth-century Mormon 
women, the very choice whether to accept plural marriage, its heavy 
personal consequences, and the constant rhetorical reductivism that 
controlled its representation in public debate – all created an airless 
atmosphere of stringent moral competition in which nuanced and 
meaningful public dialogue about plural marriage, let alone about 
underlying issues of family configuration, gender politics, and identity, was 
virtually impossible.  
The principal clash of public narratives over Mormon polygamy in 
nineteenth-century America was, by any standard, fundamentalist, although 
some subsidiary narratives, whether of the libertarian kind expressed by 
John Stuart Mill or the communitarian-feminist kind forged by a number of 
Mormon polygamous wives, occasionally lifted the camouflage of self-
righteous, disingenuously figurative oratory that concealed the 
monopolistic, literalist, “through-line” of the main combatants in the 
narrative battle over plural marriage.
It is only now that the ambiguous narrative of those women, at that time, 
in those circumstances, is being thoughtfully reconstructed, and as such, the 
narrative of women living in “the Principle” in the nineteenth century 
assumes a measure of authenticity, and thus cultural legitimacy, at least 
among some of us who read that narrative today, identify with conflicts and 
concerns it evokes, and are compelled to think about ourselves more deeply 
and to read and write our narratives more circumspectly.   
D. LEGAL NARRATIVES OF MORMON POLYGAMY
Nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy was contested on the public 
stage, not only through cultural narratives, but also through legal narratives 
– narratives of social order preserved through the highly formalized 
medium of judicial discourse.  In particular, I want to examine one truly 
consequential judicial narrative of polygamy: the Supreme Court’s 1879 
decision in Reynolds v. United States, in which the Court upheld federal 
laws illegalizing polygamy, thus declaring that the practice was not 
protected as an exercise of religion under the First Amendment’s Free 
101
 Bushman, supra note 1, at xix.
Pingree 33
Exercise Clause.102
Leaving aside for now the outcome of the Court’s decision, the 
Reynolds opinion is a telling narrative of the preeminence of social order 
because the opinion exemplifies the dynamics and implications of judicial 
rhetoric, especially the necessary acts of judicial framing of and syllogistic 
reasoning about social conflicts, and the judicial bequest of cultural 
legitimacy that follows from those operations.  The opinion also embodies, 
and is mediated by, several other powerful “authority” narratives of 
American law, including the ideals of social tradition, legal precedent, value 
neutrality, and principled decision-making, which serve to uphold the larger 
narrative of maintaining social order.  Understanding this matrix of legal 
narratives is crucial to understanding how the law uniquely frames and 
resolves social conflict.103
In his introduction to Law and the Order of Culture,104 Robert Post 
identifies the dynamic relationship between law – in the largest sense, our 
system of social order – and the ambient culture.  Post argues that “social 
order requires the mediation of social meaning, and that social meaning 
arises through the operation of systems that are simultaneously symbolic 
and practical.”105  This formulation provides us with an enlarged view of 
how law functions to both reflect and stimulate our ongoing sense of “the 
order of things.”106 Michel Foucault deftly located this sense of order in the 
relation between a society’s “ordering codes” and its “reflections upon 
order itself” – and we could recast this relation as that between society’s 
“narratives of order” and its “overarching, evolving narrative about order 
itself.”107  This order-oriented framework of the law is important because it 
helps us think about how the American judiciary, as the foremost formal 
source of our “ordering codes,” frames social controversies so as to 
maintain the larger social order.  
More concretely, if “bondage instead of empowerment of women” and 
“the deviant, immoral sexuality of polygamy” were salient tropes deployed 
by critics of polygamy in nineteenth-century America, legal discourse on 
the subject of polygamy centered on the value of the narrative of social 
order.  Yet how the judiciary works to regulate and maintain this narrative 
102
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of order is a complicated, multi-faceted process. In executing its role at the 
center of the Anglo-American common law system, the Supreme Court 
labors under a truly unique rhetorical burden, constructing and presenting 
its opinions, in which it publicly represents and resolves complex social 
questions, in ways that maintain what it perceives to be the prevailing social 
order and justify its decisions in legally legitimate terms and principles.  
These terms and principles amount to compact narratives of legitimacy, for 
each enables the necessary public justification of the opinion and thus adds 
weight to the court’s decision as a social template – as a precedent for 
future similar situations. 
James Boyd White, as astute reader of judicial opinions, provides a rich 
characterization of all that is at work in a judicial opinion, the highest form 
of legal narrative:
The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the 
case, telling its story in a particular way; it explains or 
justifies the result; and in the process it connects the case 
with earlier cases, the particular facts with more general 
concerns.  It translates the experience of the parties, and the 
languages in which they naturally speak of it, into the 
language of the law, which connects cases across time and 
space; and it translates the texts of the law – the statutes and 
opinions and constitutional provisions – into the terms 
defined by the facts of the present case.  The opinion thus 
engages in the central conversation that is for us the law, a 
conversation that the opinion itself makes possible.  In doing 
these things it makes two claims of authority: for the texts 
and judgments to which it appeals, and for the methods by 
which it works. 108
With this critical orientation in mind, let us briefly follow the public debate 
about the perceived threat of Mormon polygamy to the social and political 
order of nineteenth-century America, before we turn to the Reynolds
decision itself. 
In 1856, Brigham Young, in one of many such imperious 
statements, declared that “[t]he sound of polygamy is a terror to the 
pretended republican government.  Why?  Because this work is destined to 
revolutionize the world and bring all under subjection.”109  Young’s 
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towering predictions of social revolution were not exclusively concerned 
with the governmental order, but with the larger social order as well.  As 
historian Michael Quinn describes it,
The Saints spoke directly to questions absorbing 
many others at the time – sexuality, health, and home, but 
posited polygamy as the solution to these ills.  Mormon 
polygamy was not simply counter-cultural, it was the highest 
form of marriage relationship.  The Latter-Day Saints did not 
recognize the disaster if non-Mormons believed Mormon 
defenses of polygamy.  If polygamy was the real answer to 
society’s ills, then ‘Gentiles’ had every reason to fear that 
Mormon polygamy was the marriage relationship to end all 
other marriage relationships.110
Official Mormon representations of polygamy were understandably 
threatening, especially to those concerned with the American legal order.  
Indeed, such seemingly hegemonic projections, however figuratively they 
may have been intended, would lead someone like Congressman 
Cradlebaugh of Nevada to issue the warning that I discussed in Chapter One 
(“People in our midst . . . are building up, consolidating and daringly 
carrying out a system, subversive to the Constitution and laws, and fatal to 
morals and true religion.”111).
In light of such apocalyptic predictions, the public understandably 
perceived Mormonism as a threat to the ideals of individualism, the 
monogamous family, and the rule of law – cherished elements of the 
nineteenth-century American cultural order.  Historian David Brion Davis 
has summarized this tension in terms quite sympathetic to the Mormon 
narrative of community:
[The Mormon] gospel of work was communal rather 
than individual, and they took out to the frontier with them 
an organization and an outlook that was guaranteed to 
alienate the selfish and violent individualists who were to 
surround them.  If you followed a new Enoch west in order 
to build a new Zion, then you were engaged in nation 
building of a kind very different from your neighbors’ mode 
of enlarging the republic.112
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This incompatibility of narratives of community and individualism 
characterized much of the relationship of American law to Mormon 
polygamy in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Indeed, fear of the 
Mormon threat to the American cultural order seemed to animate the entire 
public legal conversation about the Mormons.  
As I have mentioned, the Mormon polygamous threat infused 
Congressional debate (especially when slavery was at issue) in the 1850s 
and 1860s, leading to Congressional passage of The Morrill Act in 1862, 
the first of several pieces of federal legislation designed to eliminate 
Mormon polygamy.  The Morrill Act invalidated all Utah laws that 
“‘establish, support, maintain, shield, or countenance polygamy’” and made 
bigamy a crime punishable by a maximum fine of $500 and a maximum 
incarceration of five years.113 Yet the Morrill Act, while “constitutionally 
pure, . . . was practically worthless”114
Indeed, in a territory where three-quarters of the population was 
Mormon, bigamy prosecution became a farce: “polygamists went into 
hiding in the ‘Underground,’ key witnesses disappeared, plural wives 
refused to testify against their husbands, and sympathetic juries would not 
convict.”115  Moreover, the Civil War and Reconstruction occupied the 
federal government until the mid-1870s, after which the government more 
forcefully turned its attention to “the Mormon Question.” Congress 
responded to President Ulysses Grant’s call for new legislation to outlaw 
this “barbarism" by passing the Poland Act of 1874, which divested the 
Mormon-controlled probate courts of their power to hear civil, chancery, 
and criminal actions and transferred jurisdiction over all important cases to 
the federal territorial courts.116
Hence the Morrill Act had little effect until 1874, when its 
constitutionality was tested in the case against George Reynolds, private 
secretary to Brigham Young and a practicing polygamist.  That case 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1879.  Generally speaking, the Court 
addressed the question of whether plural marriage, which the Mormons 
asserted was essential to their religion, was protected as the free exercise of 
religion guaranteed under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
Specifically, the question presented to the Court was whether George 
Reynolds, who was married to two women, could be prosecuted under a 
federal bigamy law117 that criminalized plural marriage of any kind.  
Although the Mormons expected the Court to rule in their favor, the justices 
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made this the occasion for establishing a critical distinction in First 
Amendment doctrine between religious belief and religious conduct – a 
doctrinal boundary that remains valid today.118
The Reynolds opinion, authored by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, is 
interesting for many reasons, but here I will focus on how Waite moved 
rhetorically to frame and resolve the fundamental problem that this case 
presented: the threat to social order posed by Mormon plural marriage. In 
setting the context for the Court’s decision, the Chief Justice began by 
problematizing the meaning of religion itself:
The word “religion” is not defined in the 
Constitution.  We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain 
its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than 
to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision 
[the First Amendment] was adopted.  The precise point of 
the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom that has been 
guaranteed.119
Waite then drew on the deepening historical and philosophical roots of First 
Amendment doctrine, quoting Thomas Jefferson’s flowery formulation to 
assert the crucial distinction between belief and practice:
. . . to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers 
into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or 
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, 
is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious 
liberty,” such that “it is time enough for rightful purposes of 
civil government for its officers to interfere when principles 
break out into overt acts against peace and good order.”  In 
these two sentences is found the true distinction between 
what properly belongs to the church and what to the State. 120
Having initiated his approach to the problem of plural marriage by setting 
himself firmly on Jefferson’s unassailable shoulders, Waite proceeded to 
build and refine that framework, quoting Jefferson’s famous articulations 
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that “religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God” and 
“that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, not 
opinions”; these axioms, Waite suggested, formed the basis for America’s 
proverbial “wall of separation between church and State.”121
In this deep historical soil Waite planted a standard by which to 
evaluate the problematic social practice of Mormon polygamy:
Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of 
the advocates of the . . . [First Amendment], it may be 
accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope 
and effect of the amendment thus secured.  Congress was 
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was 
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social 
duties or subversive of good order.122
The rhetorical decision to twice frame the problem this way – to make 
subversion of good order the threshold criterion for First Amendment 
protection of religious behavior – helps illuminate the subtle, easily effaced 
and naturalized, but deeply significant relationship between the putatively 
clean pronouncements of the American judiciary and the complex, concrete 
social issues that give rise to those abstract decisions.  
Let us recall Robert Post’s observation about the dynamic, if uneasy, 
relationship between law and the surrounding culture in which law, our
official system of order, lives and breathes.  Post emphasizes the fluid and 
far-ranging interpretive possibilities that reside in judicial acts (“social order 
requires the mediation of social meaning, and that social meaning arises 
through the operation of systems that are simultaneously symbolic and 
practical.”)123  Post’s formulation of the relationship between law and 
culture, beyond acknowledging the heavy social ramifications of judicial 
decisions (as opposed to, say, the less immediately pragmatic consequences 
of the public utterances of literary theorists), provides an enlarged view of 
how law functions both to reflect and to stimulate our evolving sense of the 
order of things.
I continue to focus here on this basic sense of social order because it 
helps us think about how the American judiciary, a salient source and the 
primary arbiter of our ordering codes, frames cultural controversies like 
polygamy so as to serve and maintain the larger social order itself (whatever 
that might be), which in turn determines how particular definitions of 
identity – both community and individual – may or may not legitimately 
inhabit the larger culture.  Thus in 1879 Chief Justice Waite could invoke 
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well known and authoritative political, social, and moral narratives inherited 
from the Founding Fathers in order to frame the legal question regarding 
polygamy as a simple, if vague, query about whether it was “subversive of 
good order.”  
Yet having reduced the legal resolution of the problem to this single 
question, Waite would not ponder the seemingly complex meanings of good 
order, let alone consider what behaviors could amount to subversion of it, 
even though he had paused earlier to meditate on the problem of defining 
religion, something equally fundamental to the Court’s determination of 
whether polygamy should receive Constitutional protection.  Rather, Waite 
moved directly from framing the legal question as whether polygamy was 
subversive of good order to concluding, through terse historical summary, 
that polygamy was indeed problematic to the established social order of 
western civilization:
Polygamy has always been odious among the 
northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the 
establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost 
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and African 
people.  At common law, the second marriage was always 
void . . ., and from the earliest history of England polygamy 
has been treated as an offence against society.124
Whatever one’s view of plural marriage, the Chief Justice’s reasoning here 
seems somewhat conclusory and detached, suggesting that historical 
precedent alone justifies what we desire in our social order and implying 
that a practice such as polygamy could be accommodated only by the social 
order of cultures foreign to our own.
Such one-dimensional cultural analysis, although not uncommon in 
judicial discourse, raises difficult questions about what precisely the Court 
meant in defining religion a la Jefferson as a “matter which lies solely 
between man and his God.”  Surely even this robust concept had its limits, 
for Chief Justice Waite had no compunctions about condemning the faith of 
those who “believed human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious 
worship,”125 just as, for example, Congressman Ward of Illinois, in an 
influential Congressional debate five years before Reynolds, had seen no 
valid legal distinction between Mormon polygamy, which “sacrifices 
women to the lusts of men,” and those so-called “religions” in whose name 
“the widow mounts the funeral pyre of India,” or for which “helpless infants 
are sacrificed in the waters of the Ganges.”126 Rather, such arguments 
124 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
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seemed secondary to the deeper anxiety that Mormon polygamy was, as the 
Chief Justice had concluded, subversive of good order.
Despite the inconsistencies and selective myopia of the Reynolds
decision, from a rhetorical standpoint we see also the careful construction of 
a compelling legal narrative, the telling of a story based on reasoning that 
serves to justify a clear legal answer to a pressing social question in the eyes 
of the story’s intended readership: e.g., “Polygamy should not receive 
Constitutional protection simply because it stems from religious belief; 
otherwise, any social conduct, however harmful to individuals or society at 
large, would be constitutionally protected so long as that conduct was 
undertaken in the service of sincere religious belief.  Thus to give legal 
protection to polygamy potentially jeopardizes us all in ways beyond the 
specific social harm that many believe polygamy does by itself.“  Here the 
author of the legal narrative, Chief Justice Waite, appeals widely to sources 
of authority which he knows the audience will respect: established moral 
traditions, legislative decisions, and recognized and established processes of 
rational argument.  In short, we see here American law’s unique blend of 
rhetoric and logic, a story of core values confirmed and preserved in a 
principled way.  
First, in Waite’s argument for history and tradition, he gives the 
follow account:
In connection with the case we are now considering, 
it is a significant fact that on the 8th of December, 1788, 
after the passage of the act establishing religious freedom, 
and after the convention of Virginia had recommended as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States the 
declaration in a bill of rights that “all men have an equal, 
natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, 
according to the dictates of conscience,” the legislature of 
that State substantially enacted the statute of James I 
[prohibiting polygamy], death penalty included, because, as 
recited in the preamble, “it hath been doubted whether 
bigamy or poligamy [sic] be punishable by the laws of this 
Commonwealth.”  12 Hening’s Stat. 691.  From that day to 
this we think it may safely be said there never has been a 
time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been 
an offence against society, cognizable by the civil courts and 
punishable with more or less severity.127
Sess., June 2, 1874, 447).
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In effect, Waite is saying that this behavior should be criminalized merely 
because it has been so for a very long time, just as, more than a century 
later, Justice Byron White would invoke tradition as a compelling ground 
for upholding state laws making consensual homosexual conduct a crime.128
Next, Waite relies on popular political theory of the time to argue 
that polygamy is a kind of dictatorship at the family level, which can lead 
lead to a breakdown in democracy at the national level:
In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to 
believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom 
was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most 
important feature of social life.  Marriage, while from its 
very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most 
civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by 
law.  Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its 
fruits spring social relations and social obligations and 
duties, with which government is necessarily required to 
deal.  In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous 
marriages are allowed, do we find principles on which the 
government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests.  
Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal 
principle, and which, when applied to large communities, 
fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that 
principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.  
Chancellor Kent observes that this remark is equally striking 
and profound.  2 Kent, Com. 81, note (e).  An exceptional 
colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may 
sometimes exist for a time without appearing to disturb the 
social condition of the people who surround it; but there 
cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of 
constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of 
every civil government to determine whether polygamy or 
monogamy shall be the law of social life under its 
dominion.129
In the end, there are reasons to admire the Chief Justice’s handiwork here.  
Throughout the Reynolds opinion, Waite weaves together on the loom of 
legal reasoning strands of history, tradition, legislative process and intent, 
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and sociological theory, all to create a rhetorically sturdy fabric of argument 
to support the prohibition of Mormon polygamy in order to maintain the 
prevailing family order.    
Yet there is more to judicial narratives than the aesthetics of the 
crafting; when a court reaches one conclusion instead of any other, that 
choice makes concrete things happen.  Here, the Court’s story of the need to 
preserve social order put George Reynolds in prison and compelled 
dramatic change in a community and its social and religious practices.  The 
practical consequences of the Chief Justice’s framing of the polygamy 
question give this decision teeth sharper and jaws more powerful than come 
with most rhetorical choices.  In ruling that the Constitution could not 
protect Mormon polygamy because it was criminal conduct, rather than the 
necessary behavioral manifestation of an unconventional belief system (and 
this being a judicial decision, it indeed had to be one or the other), the Court 
in 1879 performed its necessary function of framing urgent social issues in 
order to determine what was legally and, at least to a refracted degree, 
culturally acceptable.  That this judicial function is necessary does not mean 
that the justices’ concrete acts of framing are themselves immune to our 
scrutiny; on the contrary, it is the very quality – the social justification and 
general persuasiveness – of those framing decisions that makes a difference 
to us as members of the American polity.
The late Robert Cover argued that in discursive acts such as those 
discussed above, there inheres a kind of social violence,130 and Stephen 
Carter has suggested that through such legally legitimate forms of rhetorical 
framing, a culture may marginalize, and thus “rid itself of [the] movements . 
. . and religions” that threaten its prevailing order.”131 While these ominous 
claims are debatable, the fact – and the impact – of judicial framing are 
undeniable.  Much more could be said here about the necessary politics of 
the judicial process, but for our discussion, suffice it to say that this socially 
crucial judicial function – the framing of issues for legal disposition – is, as 
an especially formal and practically influential version of public discourse, 
also a potentially specialized medium for rhetorical reductivism.  Whether 
that actually is the case depends, of course, upon the quality and candor of 
the judicial expression at issue, but neither the institutional authority in 
which it is robed nor the immediacy of its social impact should prevent us 
from seeing that, like the other forms of public discourse examined here, 
judicial discourse can wield its own problematic power in the representation 
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– and thus the public understanding and treatment – of social controversies 
like Mormon polygamy.     
To the shock of most Mormons, George Reynolds’ conviction was 
upheld, and after failing to secure either a pardon from President Rutherford 
Hayes or a rehearing before the Supreme Court, Reynolds went to prison in 
Lincoln, Nebraska, and later in the Utah Territory.  Still, the Reynolds
decision empowered Congress to punish polygamy only through the Morrill 
Act, an unwieldy instrument at best.  It wasn’t until 1882, with passage of 
the Edmunds Act, that Congress developed a truly efficient method for 
prosecuting polygamists:   
[The Act made it] easier to secure bigamy 
convictions by making it a crime for any male in the United 
States territory merely to cohabit – not marry – with more 
than one woman.  It disqualified from jury service in bigamy 
and cohabitation prosecutions all who believed in or 
practiced either polygamy or unlawful cohabitation.  In 
addition, convicted bigamists and ‘cohabs,’ as they were 
quickly dubbed, lost their eligibility to vote and to hold 
public office.132
The results were significant:  by 1893, after the Church had renounced 
polygamy and prosecutions had largely ceased, “there had been 1004 
convictions for unlawful cohabitation and thirty-one for polygamy.”133
The government dealt a final blow to Mormon polygamy in 1887, 
when Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which effectively 
dissolved the Church as a corporation, allowed for the confiscation of most 
Church assets, and repealed the Utah legislation granting women the right 
to vote.  In 1890, the Church issued “The Manifesto,” purportedly the 
product of divine revelation, which promised that Church members would 
cease the practice of plural marriage.134
As I suggested at the outset of this section, polygamy, like 
communism or abortion or drugs or pornography, raises complex ethical 
questions about who we are, which is precisely why these issues generate in 
us moral ambivalence and stir in our society public controversy; it is also 
why we typically yield to the intoxicating power of didactically ordered 
narratives in our public representation and response.  But we stand to lose 
much in that kind of telling, for if the reach of our desire for mutual 
understanding exceeds the grasp of our public discourse, and this because 
we habitually frame the difficult moral issue as the easily decidable one, 
132 Magrath, supra note 24, at 535.  See also Firmage, supra note 23, at 775.
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then we have learned to live in a kind of collective denial about ourselves 
and each other.  
III. NOTES FROM A CURRENT NARRATIVE HOLY WAR: 
THE ANALOGY OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Small wonder, then, that the self is a public topic and that its 
“betterment“ is regarded not just as a personal matter but 
as meriting the care of those charged with maintaining a 
proper moral order – the church, the school, the family, and, 
of course, the state itself.135
– Jerome Bruner
The only politics that can survive an encounter with this 
world, and still speak convincingly of freedom and justice 
and democracy, is a politics that can encompass both the 
harmonics and the dissonance.  The frazzle, the rubbed raw, 
the unresolved, the fragile and the fiery, and the dangerous: 
These are American things.  This jangle is our movement 
forward, if we are to move forward; it is our survival, if we 
are to survive.136
– Tony Kushner 
A. INTRODUCTION: MORMON POLYGAMY AS A WINDOW 
ON THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTROVERSY 
Throughout our history, Americans have done battle over ideas of 
community and autonomy through various languages of our culture137 –
including religion, politics, sexuality, and, most certainly, the law.  Of 
course, ideas of community and autonomy – of the collective and the 
individual – have been in tension throughout the history of western 
civilization, particularly from the Enlightenment through modernity and 
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See, e.g., Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, in CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL STUDIES, 
AND THE LAW: MOVING BEYOND LEGAL REALISM 37 (Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, 
eds., 2003).  For an excellent introduction to the growing field of law and culture studies, 
see AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, The Cultural Lives of Law, in LAW IN THE 
DOMAINS OF CULTURE 1 (1998). 
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postmodernity.  In recent decades, for example, this ongoing public 
conversation about community and autonomy has manifest itself with 
special intensity in the work of liberals, like John Rawls,138 and 
communitarians, like Michael Sandel.139
Contemporary cultural debates about the relative virtues of autonomy 
and community are, effectively, variations on the fundamental question that 
motivated Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle: What makes a good society?  In 
every epoch this question has particular context and character; in the last 
two centuries, issues that have shaped that core social question include the 
nature of human subjectivity, the politics of state and social power, and the 
role of language in mediating cultural conflict – the issue that this article 
addresses by focusing on how the classic community-autonomy tension 
shaped the public debate about Mormon polygamy.  As we have seen, 
nineteenth-century polygamy posed a profound threat to prevailing notions 
of family, sexuality, and social order generally.  
Using the “case” of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy, I have 
explored some of the manifold rhetorical strategies that writers or speakers 
use to pursue their discursive goals.  Broadly speaking, such goals are 
invariably related to the desire to persuade others of the legitimacy of a 
certain value, opinion, perspective, ideology, or the like.  I have considered 
nineteenth-century cultural140 narratives concerned with criticizing or 
embracing the experience of American women who chose to be part of the 
Mormon church and thus to accept the practice of polygamy.  I have also 
considered nineteenth-century legal141 narratives of Mormon polygamy, 
narratives produced by judges to explain why plural marriage undertaken in 
the name of religious belief could be prohibited, and why plural marriage 
had to yield to the tradition of monogamous marriage so as to maintain 
“good social order.“  Both kinds of narratives tended to be more 
“fundamentalist“ than “literary,“ although legal (judicial) narratives were 
perhaps more deliberately principled in their stated commitment to the 
related values of legal precedent and social tradition.
My rhetorical approach to the American “telling“ of Mormon polygamy 
over a century ago illuminates a set of contemporary social controversies 
that underscore the paradox of community and autonomy – namely, 
controversies surrounding homosexuality, including job and housing 
discrimination, military service, private sexual conduct, and, most recently, 
same-sex marriage.  In this last section, I will suggest ways in which the 
138 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM (1996).
139 See, e.g., Michael Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal 
Rights and Civic Virtues, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1997); Keynote Address: Democracy’s 
Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 85 GEO. L.J. 2073 (1997).
140 See my brief qualification of the notion of “culture,” supra at note 137.
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method of rhetorical analysis that I have established as to Mormon 
polygamy might inform our understanding of the same-sex marriage debate.
First, I will briefly describe the same-sex marriage controversy and how 
it embodies the community-autonomy paradox in ways similar to those that 
animated the clash of public narratives over nineteenth-century Mormon 
polygamy.  Next, I will analyze several narratives of homosexuality that are 
essentially fundamentalist, narratives mainly having to do with the issue of 
homosexual marriage.  In contrast, I will then read several narratives of 
homosexualty that demonstrate literary qualities and thus approximate the 
ideal of producing crafty narratives of marriage, a social institution far more 
complex than most current public narratives would suggest. 
B. THE COMMUNITY-AUTONOMY PARADOX 
IN POLYGAMYAND HOMOSEXUALITY  
Anyone remotely interested in American politics during the last 
several years will have noticed the enormous amount of attention focused 
on the question of whether homosexuals should be allowed to enter into 
legally recognized relationships, whether in the form of civil unions, or, 
more controversially, marriage.  David Blankenhorn of the Institute for 
American Values, an organization that opposes homosexual marriage, has 
aptly captured the state of public discourse on this question: “The only way 
anybody is talking about marriage these days is in the context of same-sex 
marriage.”142  Indeed, in the wake of both the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lawrence v. Texas143 and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ 
ruling in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,144 the question of 
same-sex marriage has fueled innumerable cultural debates, influenced 
many political campaigns, emboldened some citizens to engage in civil 
disobedience, and led to calls for state and federal legislators to amend their 
constitutions.  The political air is thick with narratives about marriage, 
homosexuals, and whether they belong together.
Whether one individual or group “belongs” within a larger 
community (be it physical or ideological) is one of the major fault lines of 
the community-autonomy paradox, and perhaps the most salient in the eyes 
of the law, which must concern itself with problems and principles of 
fairness and justice in matters including exclusion, association, and identity.  
In the case of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy, we have seen that the 
Supreme Court decided that a singular religious community could be 
142
 William Raspberry, Reasons for Marriage, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2004, at A21.
143
 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy was 
unconstitutional).
144
 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that a Massachusetts licensing statute that 
prohibited same-sex couples from marrying violated the Massachusetts Constitution). 
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excluded from the protection of the Constitution because that community 
engaged in conduct that, although religiously motivated, was deemed 
harmful to marriage, family, and social order.145
Consider the matrix of community and autonomy dynamics at work 
in that situation: Mormons, after years of searching for (and finally finding) 
geographic autonomy, sought legal autonomy as a unique religious 
community; many female members of that autonomous religious 
community fought for the autonomy of individual women everywhere, such 
that those Mormon women were part of an ideological community devoted 
to the value of personal autonomy; many members of that broad ideological 
community of feminists seeking autonomy excoriated the marriage 
practices of their Mormon sisters on the ground that such practices were 
destructive to the very ideal of individual autonomy that united all of them 
in the first place; and those anti-polygamy feminists were also members of a 
still larger general community that tended to excoriate Mormons because 
they viewed polygamy as destructive to proper Christian religion, to the 
conventional family structure, and to the stability of the prevailing social 
order. 
For each individual embedded in this matrix, the tension between 
the ideals of community and autonomy truly was a paradox – an inevitable, 
complex, and unsettling state of affairs that required difficult personal, 
political, and religious choices.  Every such choice about cultural values and 
identity perforce rests on threshold interpretive or reading choices – i.e., 
internal choices about what one believes is the right way to live; social 
choices about whether and how to represent one’s values to others and how 
to interpret what others are saying about their own values; and choices 
about how, in light of these other choices, one will speak and behave as a 
social actor.  As discussed in Part II, many or all of these critical choices 
may be “settled” in the sense that they reflect an inherited, unexamined 
paradigm of values, in which case all other decisions are effectively pre-
made.  
This is common, though not necessary, to religious belief, which 
people often invoke as the trumping perspective by which to decide all 
other matters.  Whether that dispositive perspective be religious, political, 
or other, this is what Scholes refers to as a “fundamentalist” way of reading 
– as “zeal that often results in interpretive leaps to an unearned certainty of 
meaning“;146 what Rorty characterizes as “accept[ing] somebody else’s 
description of oneself, to execute a previously prepared program, to write, 
at most, elegant variations on previously written poems“;147 and what Haber 
sees as allowing our “prejudices [to] become dangerous“ because “they are 
145 Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145.
146
 Scholes, supra note 36, at 219.
147
 Rorty, supra note 45, at 28.
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dogmatic, kept hidden from view and not open to discussion.“148  In short, 
the dissonance and anxiety that come with such genuine paradoxes of 
autonomy and community tempt us to engage in our reading and narrating 
of the world simplistically, relying on inherited understandings to complex 
problems and expressing public narratives that reinforce this more 
intellectually comfortable state of affairs.  When this is the avenue we take, 
we evade the challenge of creating our own authentic narratives that address 
the evolving realities of our society – realities such as the emergence of an 
openly gay community of people whose publicy narrated ways of being, 
much like those of the nineteenth-century Mormons, challenge many 
traditional narratives of family, sexuality, and social order. 
This challenge has taken various forms over the last half century, 
and especially since the Stonewall riots of 1969, as the status of 
homosexuals in American society has evolved from near invisibility to 
active, open presence.149  As to homosexuality, the most current example of 
this challenge of how to personally reconcile the community-autonomy
paradox is the problem of same-sex marriage.  Contemporary 
homosexuals150 face a paradox similar to that experienced by nineteenth-
century Mormon feminists.  
Consider, for example, the matrix of possible community-autonomy 
dynamics at work in this situation: after years of social and legal struggle to 
achieve even a partial degree of cultural acceptance and legitimacy, many 
homosexuals find themselves torn between profound loyalty to a hard-won 
148
 Haber, supra note 47, at 1.
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 Scholarship, history, memoir, and other resources on homosexuality are abundant.  
For an excellent annotated bibliography, see WAYNE DYNES, HOMOSEXUALITY: A 
RESEARCH GUIDE (1987).  For a continually updated bibliography on virtually all 
publications related to homosexuality, see Paul Halsall, Homosexuality in History: A 
Partially Annotated Bibliography, at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pwh/gayhistbib.html.   
For perhaps the most complete collection of seminal theoretical and historical writings in 
Lesbian and Gay Studies, see THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER (Henry Abelove, 
Michele Aina Barale, and David Halperin, eds., 1993).  For an influential collection of 
memoirs and essays that thoughtfully tracks the evolution of homosexuality in American 
culture over the last several decades, see EDMUND WHITE, THE BURNING LIBRARY: ESSAYS 
(David Bergman, ed., 1995).  Probably the preeminent voice in gay legal scholarship is 
William Eskridge.  For a representative and fairly comprehensive collection of his work, 
see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
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 In this article I have chosen to rely on the term “homosexual” as a fixed category, 
clearly distinct from the equally fixed category of “heterosexual.”  Although this 
distinction is heuristically necessary for my purposes here, I recognize that so clean and 
categorical a division is debatable; some conceive of sexual identity as a fluid concept, not 
easily or simply defined.  Indeed, the clash of diverse narratives about how sexual 
orientation should be defined is itself closely related to the narrative battle over same-sex 
marriage that I discuss in this section.
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gay cultural identity and a long-desired freedom to gain full social 
recognition, through marriage, for their committed life relationships; most 
openly gay people have developed, through their culturally communal 
solidarity with other homosexuals, a crucial sense of personal autonomy for 
purposes of living in an often homophobic American society; yet for many, 
loyalty to this foundational, sustaining community of other homosexuals is 
now in some degree of conflict with the prospect of gaining the right to 
legally marry their partners, because marriage itself has been, and continues 
to be, symbolic of the exclusion of homosexuals from the larger community 
of prevailing beliefs and practices regarding religion, family, and sexuality; 
thus to fight for and exercise the right to marry creates division within what 
has largely been, but is less and less, a culturally unified, even insular, gay 
community, because the choice to marry is, quintessentially, both a 
personal, autonomous act and a gesture of  assimilation into the larger 
American community – and thus a dilution, if not a betrayal, of the precious 
solidarity of the foundational gay community.151
Again, as with early Mormon women, individual homosexuals 
embedded in this matrix of personal and communal values and loyalties 
face a genuine paradox – a conflicted state of affairs that requires hard 
personal choices about ultimately irreconcilable matters of identity and self-
representation.  Also, then, for both advocates and opponents of same-sex 
marriage, the perils of fundamentalist reading, interpreting, and narrating 
are significant, for the temptation is great to embrace settled and certain –
rather than ambiguous and challenging – narratives, especially on so central 
151 One gay critic suggests that the greatest danger in this process of “narrative 
assimilation“ is that gays will lose touch with their sense of autonomy as a distinct, 
subversive community:
When the gay liberation movement was formed in 1969, we had a broad, 
expansive vision of social justice.  We wanted to change the world and 
make it better – not just for gay men and lesbians . . . but for everyone.  
We wanted to find alternatives to the traditional structures under which 
we were raised, structures that many of us found insufficient to meet our 
needs and desires.  We aligned ourselves with other movements and 
learned from them.  We got “Gay is Good“ from the Black Power 
movement’s “Black is Beautiful.“  From the new feminist movement, we 
learned that patriarchy – especially when it mandated compulsory 
heterosexuality – was as bad for queers as it was for women.  We also 
believed, like many feminists, that marriage was, at its best, an imperfect 
institution, and, at its worst, a dangerous one. . . .  All this, obviously, has 
changed.  The gay movement today has gone out of the radical-social-
change business and taken up a franchise in the let’s-just-fight-for-
equality business. 
Michael Bronski, Why Do Gays Want to Say “I Do?”, Z MAGAZINE, vol. 16, no. 
10 (2003).
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a cultural matter. 
C. SHOWCASING THE MORAL SYLLOGISM: 
FUNDAMENTALIST PUBLIC NARRATIVES OF HOMOSEXUALITY
In an editorial published in the Washington Times in April 2004, 
entertainer Pat Boone sounded a moral alarm that, for its sheer 
ominousness, is resonant of Congressman McClernand’s 1860 warning 
about the evils of polygamy:
We’re at war.  And I’m not talking about the war against 
terrorism, with its dreadful daily reminders.  I’m talking 
about the civil – and increasingly uncivil – culture war now 
raging across America . . . .  If we win, we may be able to 
rebuild the institution of marriage as the sacred bedrock of 
American societies.  If they win, we will have moral anarchy 
. . . .  There are moral absolutes in this life – and the sacred 
institution of marriage is one of them.152
Boone’s remarks are typical of the public narratives expressed in recent 
years by those who oppose gay marriage on religious (usually Christian) 
grounds: highly fundamentalist, in that such narratives deploy the language 
and imagery of holy war – framing the conflict in binary, us-versus-them 
terms and invoking an absolute moral authority to justify a conclusion of 
which their authors are certain.  
Two aspects of Boone’s cultural jeremiad are especially striking as 
to the community-autononomy paradox and the fundamentalist-literary 
spectrum of narrative.  The first is that by painting this public controversy 
as a cleanly delineated “war“ that, if lost, will result in “moral anarchy,“ 
Boone implies that America is composed of two warring communities, with 
little or nothing in between; the idea of an ambivalent, complex, or nuanced 
perspective on gay marriage seems unacceptable in this narrative.  The 
second is that Boone taps into precisely the same narrative upon which the 
Supreme Court (and most of America) relied in the late nineteenth century 
to prohibit the Mormons from practicing polygamy: the moral syllogism 
that (1) traditional marriage is “the sacred bedrock of American societies“; 
(2) that permitting a different version of that sacred marriage concept will 
surely ruin marriage as we know it (this is the unarticulated, enthymemic 
minor premise); and thus (3) the ruin of the traditional marriage concept 
will ruin society – “[i]f they win, we will have moral anarchy.“  
Consistent with the rules of formal logic, if the reader accepts the 
major and minor premises, then the conclusion inexorably follows.  Here, 
152
 Pat Boone, Wedded to the Original, WASH. TIMES, April 23, 2004.
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while it is difficult to dispute the empirical validity of the major premise 
(i.e., conventional heterosexual, monogamous marriage has been, for better 
or worse, the structural center of modern western civilizations), the minor 
premise – the unspoken assumption that allowing any variation on the 
established order of marriage will necessarily denigrate that convention –
seems, at least on its own, far from clear, regardless of one’s views on the 
sexual orientation of individuals.153
As in Boone’s editorial, some version of the logical syllogism is 
typically operative in all public narratives; this is especially the case in legal 
reasoning, where the value of “logic“ is paramount.  Jerome Bruner 
evocatively makes this point about the normative nature of all rhetorical 
acts of “framing,“ whether in conventional stories or legal arguments:
Stories surely are not innocent: they always have a message, 
most often so well concealed that even the teller knows not 
what ax he may be grinding.  For example, stories typically 
begin by taking for granted (and asking the hearer or reader 
to take for granted) the ordinariness or normality of a given 
state of things in the world – what ought to prevail when Red 
Riding Hood visits her grandmother, or what a black kid 
ought to expect on arriving at a school door in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, after Brown v. Board of Education struck down 
racial segregation.154
As Bruner suggests, to “tak[e] for granted (and asking the hearer or reader 
to take for granted) the ordinariness or normality of a given state of things 
in the world”155 is, in principle, to posit the major premise of an argument, 
153
 As a preface to his core coventional-marriage-as-sacred-social-foundation narrative, 
Boone appeals to the contemporary American reader’s understandable concern about 
current dangers: “We are at war.“  This otherwise common rhetorical strategy (appeal to 
something familiar to the reader in order to make a point about an analogically related 
matter) is notable for where it leads: as between the physical “war against terrorism“ and 
the ideological war over the meaning of marriage, Boone’s ensuing narrative seems to 
suggest that the war about marriage is the more consequential of the two.  If the reader is 
persuaded by Boone’s strategy and thus believes that the war for ownership of the meaning
of marriage is paramount, then it is fair to say that devotion to the traditional concept of 
marriage has itself reached the status of religion, in addition to being an important 
component of religion.  See Niebuhr, supra text accompanying note 21, at 6-9; see also
BLOOM, supra note 21, at 30.  (Recall Niebuhr’s wording that “[t]he mark of religion is that 
it is the practice of an ultimate concern that orders all other concerns, an unconditioned 
loyalty that trumps all other loyalties.“) Boone’s assertion that “[t]here are moral absolutes 
in this life – and the sacred institution of marriage is one of them“ seems to comport with 
this reading of his marriage narrative as tantamount to scripture.
154 BRUNER, supra note 135, at 5-6.
155 Id.
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whether explicitly (as in conventional arguments) or implicitly (as in 
conventional narratives – “stories“).  Thus even where the speaker is a 
social commentator, like Boone, the framing of the terms of the argument –
the “taking for granted . . . the ordinariness or normality of a given state of 
things“ – is an inevitably normative act.  
It is crucial to understand the rhetorical function and power of the 
moral syllogism, for these help demonstrate the basic relationship between
the fundamentalist-literary narrative spectrum and the community-
autonomy paradox.  First, because the act of framing a moral syllogism – of 
positing the premises of one’s argument – inheres in all argument-
narratives, it matters tremendously whether the speaker’s framing act if 
more or less fundamentalist or literary, for the character of the narrative 
follows directly from that threshold rhetorical decision.  Boone’s narrative 
on marriage, for example, takes for granted both that marriage is “the sacred 
bedrock“ of our society and that permitting a same-sex variation on that 
sacred idea will ruin our way of life.  As I have pointed out, while the first 
of these premises is at least empirically sound, the second is far from clear 
or persuasive except to those who already believe it; this second premise 
does not even pretend to address alternative perspectives or beliefs, such 
that the terms of the discussion are firmly set, rather than open to 
discussion, and the conclusion that permitting same-sex marriage will create 
“moral anarchy“ is inevitable.  This makes for a narrative that leans heavily 
toward the fundamentalist end of the reading spectrum, since it both 
precludes open discussion and conceals any possible conflict or 
ambiguity.156
Second, once an author has framed a narrative so as to “draft“ on the 
momentum of the moral syllogism embedded in that narrative, the author 
has essentially drawn lines of ideological community, rhetorically including
those who agree with the author’s premises, excluding those who disagree, 
and possibly persuading those who are undecided.  This three-part audience 
map will form and potentially evolve depending on how literary or 
fundamentalist the author makes the narrative.  Thus, for example, a 
narrative framed according to a heavily fundamentalist moral syllogism, 
like Boone’s, will yield an audience map starkly divided into just two areas 
– the land of the converted and the land of the enemy – with no land for 
those in the middle.  This fundamentalist narrative approach makes for 
clearly identifiable, strictly autonomous ideological communities, but tends 
to preclude open, meaningful exchange between the communities as well as 
the possiblity that someone with mixed views might arrive at a thoughtful, 
156 See SCHOLES, supra note 36, at 231 (reasoning that “fundamentalist reading is 
always marked by shifts from the literal to the figurative – as a way of concealing 
conflicts.”)  Boone’s reliance on general, unsubstantiated, figurative terms like “sacred 
bedrock” and “moral anarchy” would appear to exemplify Scholes’ point.  
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educated conclusion.  
The author of a more literary narrative, on the other hand, will tend 
to build upon a moral syllogism whose premises are transparent, openly 
articulated, and susceptible of reasonable inquiry and disagreement.  This 
does not mean that the literary narrative must eschew commitment to 
particular values.  On the contrary, the literary narrative must be especially 
principled, in that the moral syllogism upon which the narrative proceeds 
must be open to ambiguity, complexity, and difference – and the substantive 
ideology of that moral syllogism, the speaker’s values as to that narrative, 
must survive or fail in the face of those tempering factors.  Accordingly, the 
literary narrative will produce broader, more nuanced, more porously 
boundaried audience communities, because the underlying moral syllogism 
will not dictate a strictly divided map of the ideological landscape, but will 
instead allow for both overlap among communities and for one’s 
membership in multiple communities.157  In short, and at the risk of 
indulging in too many religious metaphors, the fundamentalist narrative will 
tend to “preach to the converted,“ while the literary narrative will tend to 
engage with the multitudes.
Among legal narratives of homosexuality, Justice Byron White’s 
1986 majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick is exemplary of the 
fundamentalist narrative.  Justice White‘s opinion rests on a moral 
syllogism158 about homosexuality quite similar to the moral syllogism that 
Chief Justice Waite relied on in Reynolds.159  In Bowers, White initially 
framed the opinion by adroitly sifting alternative threshold questions from 
157
 My characterization of ideological communities has much in common with the 
notion of “interpretive communities” that has emerged in literary theory in recent decades.  
See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1978); DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 36.
158 Judicial opinions typically proceed on the basis of at least one central syllogism, a 
rhetorical device well suited to the necessary judicial framing of the issues in a case.  While 
few judicial opinions specifically identify all three formal parts of the syllogism (i.e., the 
major and minor premises and the conclusion), the syllogistic reasoning process is 
invariably at work, given the need in the common law judicial process to frame issues and 
reach conclusions on the authority of established precedent.  That is, the major premise of 
the opinion’s reasoning is typically some version of an established precedent – this is 
where the judge’s critical framing decision comes into play.  Once a judge frames that 
major premise, the scope of possible minor premises narrows, and, more important, the 
conclusion that follows from both premises is nearly inevitable.  This syllogistic 
mechanism is a salient example of how “logic“ matters in a rhetorical way in legal 
reasoning: the framing of the major and minor premises are authorial choices, shaped by a 
judge’s discretion and values, be they principled or not; but the conclusion that follows is 
more predictable, as it is dictated by the initial premises.  For a federal appellate judge’s 
detailed discussion of the practical role of formal logic in the judicial process, see 
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 
(1997). 
159 See supra text accompanying note 128, at 40-44.
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the question upon which he would base his reasoning:
This case does not require a judgment on whether 
laws against sodomy between consenting adults in general, 
or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable.  
It raises no question about the right or propriety of state 
legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize 
homosexual sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating 
those laws on state constitutional grounds.  The issue 
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy 
and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still 
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long 
time.160
White re-emphasized this threshold question in observing that “[p]recedent 
aside, . . . respondent [Hardwick] would have us announce . . . a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”161
The major premise of White’s moral syllogism can be stated as a 
straightforward question: Does the Constitution provide homosexuals the 
fundamental right to have sodomy?  From here, Justice White follows the 
logical momentum of this major premise.  In William Eskridge‘s 
description:
As narrowed in this way, Hardwick’s claim struck the 
Supreme Court as unlike those in earlier privacy cases, 
which had arisen in the context of heterosexual intimacy.
Key to the Court’s analysis was its belief that the due process 
right of privacy could only be applied to protect those 
fundamental liberties “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.‘“  Because “homosexual sodomy“ had long 
been criminal in Anglo-American law, the Court held that 
there was no “‘deeply rooted‘“ liberty Hardwick could claim.  
In the light of history, the Court majority found Hardwick’s 
fundamental rights claim “at best, facetious.“162
Eskridge identifies the minor premise of White’s syllogism, which can be 
stated in relation to the major premise like this: In order to receive the status 
of “fundamental“ Constitutional right claimed here, the right must protect 
160 Bowers 478 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added). 
161 Id. at 191.
162 ESKRIDGE, supra note 149, at 150 (emphasis added).
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behavior that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.“163
It takes little imagination to surmise what the Court’s conclusion 
would be to the question raised, in effect, by the combined premises of 
Justice White’s moral syllogism: Is consensual homosexual activity “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition“?164  It seems certain that in no
nation’s “history and tradition“ is homosexual activity “deeply rooted.“  
Accordingly, could the opinion logically proceed in any direction other than 
it did, summarily concluding that private sex between consenting 
homosexual adults is not protected by the Constitution?
It is worth noting that Justice White articulated another possible 
minor premise to go along with the requirement that the right be “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”  Relying on language from 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), White reasoned that 
homosexual sodomy must be one of “those fundamental liberties that are 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.”165  Although White summarily 
dispensed with this premise as well (“[i]t is obvious to us that neither of 
these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to 
engage in acts of consensual sodomy”166), this “formulation” had the 
potential to produce a more literary analysis than its alternative.  
Unlike the “deeply rooted in . . . tradition” minor premise that White 
relied on, which, in fundamentalist fashion, effectively precluded discussion 
by deferring the question to the Judeo-Christian moral tradition, this 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” formulation might have enabled 
White to leaven his judicial narrative with greater nuance and thus engage a 
broader audience.  Indeed, the term “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” combined with the admonition to consider whether “liberty” or 
“justice would exist if [the claimed right] were sacrificed,” would seem to 
open the discussion of homosexuality up to a broad, culture-sensitive 
analysis.  For example, the term “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
is far more open to different and changing behavioral norms than is the term 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” which narrows the 
scope of analysis to an easily categorized, fundamentalist recitation of the 
indisputable fact that Judeo-Christian history has not been kind to 
homosexuals.  Similarly, to ask whether “liberty” or “justice would exist” if 
the right of homosexuals to have private, consensual, sex “were sacrificed” 
is a genuinely complex, open-ended question, at least in contemporary 
society. Thus both parts of this alternative premise would yield a more 
163 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 191-92.
166 Id.
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literary analysis of the behavior at issue in Bowers than the opinion itself 
demonstrates.  
In addition, the choice of determinative formulations that White 
applies here is crucial, for it defines ideological communities as to the 
outcome of the case – communities comprised of those readers who respond 
similarly to the decision according to shared values about, say, sexual 
identity or the right to privacy.  As it was decided, Bowers tended to 
produce sharply divided reactions and thus distinct, adversarial ideological 
communities regarding the issues at stake.  Such divisions, while not 
physical or geographic boundaries, nonetheless define two virtual 
communities with opposing values.  As to public engagement and social 
change, the boundaries distinguishing such ideological communities would 
seem more consequential.   
It may well be that the distinct communities defined by the 
controversial issue of homosexuality would be hard to integrate in any 
event, but honest, fair, meaningful dialogue is at least more possible if the 
opinion draws more flexible, negotiable ideological lines – a result that 
would have been more likely had White’s argument-narrative focused on 
the two alternative premises discussed above.  For example, although the 
majority of Americans would not choose to engage in homosexual activity, 
neither does it seem likely that a majority would see “justice” in summarily 
“sacrificing” protection for the private sexual acts of others, even 
homosexuals – at least not without thoughtfully exploring the ramifications 
of the question.  Indeed, such a malleable distinction would produce 
somewhat overlapping communities, reflecting at least a measure of shared 
ideology and thus the possibility of dialogue, understanding, and progress 
as to complex social controversies. 
In the end, White’s judicial narrative, while not unsophisticated in 
its rhetorical style, is remarkably fundamentalist in its substance, for it 
resolves the controversy before the Court by essentially asking a question 
from which only one answer could logically follow.  White could have 
formulated other, more literary “framing“ questions (i.e., major premises)167
or, as discussed above, contemplated more culture- and context-sensitive 
minor premises and still have arrived at the same conclusion – but with the 
result that Bowers would undoubtedly have earned greater legitimacy, if not 
agreement, within both the legal community and the general population.  
This has become increasingly clear over time given the enduring criticism 
167
 The most obvious alternative is Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 143, in which the 
Court overruled Bowers: “[it] was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick  should be and now is 
overruled.” Id. at 578.   
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of the opinion168 – culminating in the Court’s pointed overruling of Bowers
in 2003.169
Fundamentalist narratives of homosexuality are not exclusive to 
those who oppose gay rights, of course, and we can look to the same-sex 
marriage debate for evidence that narrators on the other side of the issue are 
capable of the fundamentalist tendency to simplify the complexities of both 
social controversy and the community-autonomy paradox.  Although most 
gays and lesbians appear to be unified behind the push to legalize same-sex 
marriage as a matter of equality, homosexuals nonetheless face a version of 
the community-autonomy paradox in this context as well: they fear that the 
assimilation required to embrace marriage – that most mainstream of 
cultural “sacraments“ – will mean the erosion, if not the surrender, of their 
rich, distinct sense of communal autonomy, in exchange for a generic,  
suffocating cultural status.  This fear, however justified, has led to 
narratives of same-sex marriage that embody some of the same categorical 
tendencies that characterize the fundamentalist narratives that I have 
discussed above.    
For example, the lesbian feminist writer Cheryl Clarke has remarked 
that “permanency for gays, lesbians, and other same-sex variants is the very 
prong we ‘gets hung on‘170 when the arguments for marriage equality come 
up.  We want that forever thing or the thing forever.“171  Asserting that 
“Marriage trivializes our partnerships,“ Clarke inveighs against the 
mainstreaming of “our movement“ by “liberals“:
I am calling upon bulldaggers, dykes, faggots, feminist 
femmes, fierce sissies, and other outrageous progressive 
queers to have a major multicultural sexual liberation 
confabulation to take our movement back from liberals.  
Because marriage equality with its rhetoric of sameness is 
not why we came out of the closet in 1969 or before.  We 
came out to dismantle marriage as an institution.172
Although marriage is indeed one of the most dominant, idealized, 
heavily mediated (and mediating) of American cultural narratives,173
168 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 149, at 150.
169 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 578, supra note 143.  
170
 Cheryl Clarke, The Prong of Permanency: A Rant, in I DO/I DON’T: QUEERS ON 
MARRIAGE (Greg Wharton and Ian Phillips, eds., 2004).  Clarke takes the concept and 
phrasing of “getting hungs on” from ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE 
WATCHING GOD, (1937).
171 Id.
172 Id (emphasis added).
173
 As Michael Bronski puts it, 
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marriage, like any other human relationship, is nonetheless 
inherently ambiguous, challenging, and unpredictable – a 
relationship at least as complex as the parties involved.  Thus 
marriage would genuinely “trivialize“ a gay relationship only to the 
extent that the people involved took a fundamentalist, rather than a 
literary, view of the whole adventure.  
No relationship can avoid some kind of categorization, even 
a relationship that which defines itself by defying all categories.  But 
it is not the mere fact of belonging to a category, however top-heavy 
it may be with social expectation, that makes one’s experience and 
narration of that relationship a fundamentalist one.  Rather, what 
invites the bondage of fundamentalist categorization is one’s 
unwillingness to develop literary habits of mind and action, one’s 
failure to remain vigilant toward the dangers of living and narrating 
one’s relationships in settled, inherited, unthinking ways.  While 
those who have experienced hurtful social or cultural 
marginalization (here, as to sexual identity) are attuned to the harms 
of cultural myopia and self-righteousness in ways that beneficiaries 
of the status quo usually are not, the choice to construct literary over 
fundamentalist narratives is just that – a choice, not a given.  So to 
dismiss (as Clarke seems to) all marriage relationships as 
irreversibly mediated by a “rhetoric of sameness“ and beholden to 
the insurmountable ideal of “heteronormativity“ is to mimic that 
very rhetoric of sameness.  This serves only to perpetuate the kind of 
narrative fundamentalism unabashedly proclaimed by Pat Boone,174
albeit probably not as close to that end of the narrative spectrum.
D: TOWARD  A “CRAFTY“ NARRATIVE OF MARRIAGE 
[m]arriage is so much the expectation and norm that even heterosexual 
couples have to explain why they don’t want to get married.  It is what 
we are all brought up to want and never given much permission to 
question.  It is a cultural myth many of us still embrace, despite all the 
evidence suggesting that “happily ever after“ is more aptly applied to 
fairy tales than marriages.  For some couples – straight and gay – getting 
married is easier than not getting married.  It is a learned cultural 
response that is easier to give in to than to fight. 
Bronski, supra note 151.  Bronski’s point may find support in that a growing number of 
books on how gays can plan for their weddings seem, at least by their titles, to imitate the 
nuptial narratives advertised by America’s massive marriage industry.  See, e.g., DAVID 
TOUSSAINT WITH HEATHER LEO, GAY AND LESBIAN WEDDINGS: PLANNING THE PERFECT 
SAME-SEX CEREMONY (2004); K.C. DAVID, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO GAY AND LESBIAN 
WEDDINGS (2005).
174 Supra note 152.
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In bringing this article to a close, I want to return to Scholes‘ notion 
of the “crafty reader,“175 an approach to public narrative that enables 
meaningfully principled yet open-ended debate about controversial issues –
those most in need of nuanced understanding – and, in the process, sheds 
light on the community-autonomy fault lines that run through virtually all 
important social conflicts.  I will consider a few examples of what might 
constitute a “crafty“ reading of same-sex marriage, a stern test for any 
interpretive paradigm because of the import of the stakes and the seeming 
irreconcilability of the fundamentalist positions on either side of the issue.  
To purposefully revise an established cultural narrative, particularly one as 
deeply anchored as the traditional narrative of marriage, is a herculean task.  
Yet there is no acceptable alternative if we value the ideal of a pluralistic 
society.  So I submit that, short of the ideal of full compatibility, crafty 
reading nonetheless offers all sides the possibility of enriched, elevated 
public discourse on this profoundly divisive issue. 
Recall that Scholes characterizes the crafty reader as one who 
“acknowledge[s] the seriousness of fundamentalist readings, while resisting 
and criticizing the zeal that often results in interpretive leaps to an unearned 
certainty of meaning, achieved by turning a deaf ear to the complexity of 
the texts themselves, their histories, and their present situations.“176  In 
analyzing the rhetorical holy wars over nineteenth-century Mormon 
polygamy and present-day homosexuality, I have attempted to explore the 
merits of this narrative prescription by closely reading what are largely 
fundamentalist narratives and thereby demonstrating the costs and 
limitations of the rhetorical strategies that drive them.  
In crafty narratives, by contrast, we see ways in which literary (or 
more literary) readers deploy rhetorical strategies to produce narratives that 
more accurately represent the realities of people who experience, by virtue 
of the politicized status of their cultural identities, dramatic versions of the 
paradox of community and autonomy.  First, for example, consider how two 
judicial narrators frame the issues before them in two landmark legal 
decisions.  The first is from Justice Kennedy’s 1996 majority opinion in 
Romer v. Evans,177 the other from Chief Justice Marshall’s 2003 majority 
opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.178
Justice Kennedy’s opening to the Romer opinion is, for being simply 
constructed and straightforwardly expressed, literary in the sense that it 
engages us by speaking to important cultural identity values that most of us 
actually share: 
175 Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
176 Id. at 219.
177 Romer, 517 U.S. 620, supra note 14.
178 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d 941, supra note 144.
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One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this 
Court that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).  Unheeded then, those 
words now are understood to state a commitment to the 
law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.  The 
Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle and today 
requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado’s 
Constitution.179
This decision addressed the question of the constitutionality of Colorado’s
voter-ratified Amendment 2, which would have precluded future anti-
discrimination legislation protecting homosexuals in any state context.180
However, the underlying issue here – homosexual rights, or, even more 
basically, the freedom to pursue one’s identity as an American, regardless 
of one’s sexual orientation – is neither mentioned nor even clearly implied.  
Yet Kennedy subtly creates a powerful opening to a narrative argument in 
which, to be effective, he must open his readers’ minds to the possibility of 
a concept of political identity that includes homosexuals.
Kennedy’s first rhetorical choice is to invoke the notorious Supreme 
Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,181 the late nineteenth-century case in 
which the Court let stand Jim Crow laws that effectively preserved much of 
the inequality, if not the outright slavery, of ante-bellum America, even 
some thirty years after the end of the Civil War. The Plessy decision is 
commonly invoked in contemporary American culture – in high school and 
college history classes and textbooks, in law school lectures, in political 
debates, and so on – to represent wrong and outdated racist attitudes of the 
past.  Thus in associating himself with Justice Harlan, who famously 
dissented from that now stigmatized decision, Justice Kennedy sets a tone 
and direction for the Romer opinion that suggest long-overdue rectification 
of a broad social wrong, here the formal exclusion of gays and lesbians 
from the protection of civil rights laws, and even from the legislative 
process necessary to enact those laws.
Kennedy’s next move reinforces, then builds upon, this show of judicial 
reparation: having supplied with Plessy a symbol of past racism and 
injustice, Kenney comes to the present, reminding the reader that Harlan’s 
“[u]nheeded” words “now are understood to state a commitment to the 
179 Romer, supra note 14, at 623.
180
 The textual opening of the amendment is remarkably direct in conveying its 
purpose: “No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.”  
Id. at 625.
181
 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.”182  Kennedy has 
not randomly drawn from the past to argue in the present; he has chosen 
Harlan’s memorable cry in the American political wilderness as the starting 
point of his opinion because it provides an emotionally appealing and 
logically solid foundation on which to construct his explanation, indeed his 
justification, for the Court’s decision to do in 1996 for gays and lesbians 
what the Court would not do in 1896 for black Americans.  Kennedy’s key 
rhetorical strategy is to link Harlan’s now unobjectionable clarion call for 
racial justice to the esteemed narrative that the law must, of necessity, be 
neutral, especially when it affects people’s rights.  At first glance this may 
seem redundant, but it is by such incremental steps that today’s legal 
arguments become tomorrow’s legal rules and standards, as well as the 
basis for evolving social and cultural norms.  Thus Kennedy has little to 
lose and much to gain, rhetorically, in stating what may seem obvious – that 
the law should be neutral toward all persons.  This notion is, of course, 
basic to the American legal tradition and crucial to the continued political 
and social legitimacy of the nation’s courts, most of all the Supreme Court.  
Kennedy completes this moral syllogism, which will serve to flavor the 
tone and frame the reasoning of the entire Romer narrative-argument, by 
making the project of judicial rectification, and the ethic of legal neutrality 
that drives it, subject to one of the federal Constitution’s most potent 
doctrines: “The Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle [of 
neutrality] and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado’s 
Constitution.”183  Again, while this conclusion may seem (at least to a lay 
reader) overly deferential to the authority of the U.S. Constitution, not to 
mention self-evident, it is precisely such a direct appeal to established 
textual authority that enables lawyers and judges to fashion the practically 
manageable questions and socially determinate solutions that are the 
essence of legal argumentation and discourse – legal narrative in the 
broadest sense.  Indeed, the narrative progress of conventional legal 
discourse depends upon an almost maddeningly compact and painstaking 
kind of argumentation, in which the author (whether judge or advocate) 
seeks to validate her assertions by tightly weaving precedent and analogy as 
she carefully moves up and down the scale of abstract rules and concrete 
possibilities.
Kennedy’s use of analogy is a crafty, and thus more likely to be 
persuasive, deployment of narrative.  This is because analogy, essentially a 
narrative metaphor, operates by invoking something known or familiar – an 
experience, event, situation, concept, argument, or (more likely) some 
combination of these and other tropes – in order to make accessible 
182 Romer, supra note 14, at 623.
183 Id.
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something unknown or unfamiliar.184  Thus when Kennedy invokes Plessy, 
he brings to mind a well established, layered narrative of slavery, 
discrimination, lack of equality, ignorance, bias, collective guilt, Jim Crow, 
segregated lunch counters, and so on.  Whatever else he is attempting in his 
opening, Kennedy uses that familiar narrative to morally engage the reader.
This is quite distinct from Justice White’s use of analogy in Bowers.  
There, White distinguished private, consensual, gay sex from several other 
private behaviors – among them procreation, interracial marriage, 
contraception, and abortion – to which the Court had previously granted 
constitutional protection.185  But White’s analogical reasoning, like his 
framing and application of the premises of his moral syllogism – asking and 
answering narrowly tailored yet broadly manipulable questions186 – has the 
dismissive, conclusory feel of analysis-by-fiat: 
[W]e think it is evident that none of the rights announced in 
those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed 
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of 
sodomy that is asserted in this case.  No connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and 
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated. . . 
.
187
White makes no attempt to reason about how or why sexual activity188
between two men is different from the intimate matters of marriage and 
procreation between a man and a woman – let alone to explain how the one 
bears no “resemblance” to the other.  Leaving aside the ultimate disposition 
of the case, White seems not to have wanted to engage the merits – namely, 
the complex issue of how we define, or should define, what is private or 
intimate between individuals for purposes of legal protection.  To impose 
such a narrow, closed reading on such a broad, open issue is a 
fundamentalist narrative choice indeed.  
By contrast, Kennedy’s reading of the homosexuality in Romer is 
engaged with history and context, open and attentive to the evolution of 
184 See LAKOFF AND JOHNSON, supra note 40.
185 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 -91.  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) (procreation); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973) (abortion).
186 Id. At 192; supra note 162 and accompanying text, at 55-56.
187 Id. (emphasis added).
188
 By White’s analysis, it would have made no difference whether Michael Hardwick 
and his partner considered this sexual experience an act of lust, lovemaking, or both; we 
can infer only that what mattered was simply that the two were of the same sex. 
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moral sensibility over time.189  This is clear from the effect of the opening 
paragraph alone.  Having experienced the narrative resonance of Plessy, the
reader is predisposed to see the more novel or unfamiliar situation presented 
in Romer in a similar light: “Plessy meant unfair treatment of a certain class 
of people for unacceptable reasons; perhaps Romer will mean the same 
thing if it is not decided differently.”  At core, Kennedy’s narrative here is a 
simple and persuasive moral allegory, engaging us, at the level of American 
cultural identity, toward what Rorty calls “[t]he process of coming to know 
oneself, confronting one’s contingency, tracking one’s causes home,“ –
which we achieve, however provisionally, by “inventing a new language –
that is, of thinking up some new metaphors.“190
The opening of Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Goodridge
is similarly crafty: 
Marriage is a vital social institution.  The exclusive 
commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love 
and mutual support; it brings stability to our society.  For 
those who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage 
provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social 
benefits.  In return it imposes weighty legal, financial, and 
social obligations.191
189 Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 626-37.  Kennedy’s discussion of the legal and social 
ramifications of Amendment 2 is significantly more thorough and nuanced in its reasoning 
than is White’s discussion in Bowers.  Interestingly, part of Kennedy’s justification for 
finding Amendment 2 unconstitutional involves the Court’s treatment of Mormon 
polygamists in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) at roughly the same time that Plessy
was decided:
In Davis, the Court approved an Idaho territorial statute denying 
Mormons, polygamists, and advocates of polygamy the right to vote and 
to hold office because, as the Court construed the statute, it “simply 
excludes from the privilege of voting, or of holding any office of honor, 
trust, or profit, those who have been convicted of certain offences. . . .  
Romer at 634.  The Beason court’s benign characterization of the categorical scope of the 
territorial statute is strikingly similar to White’s implicit, tradition-based justification of the 
Georgia anti-sodomy statue in Bowers.  See Bowers at 192-93. 
That Kennedy’s legal narrative in Romer is exemplary of crafty reading 
(“acknowledg[ing] the seriousness of fundamentalist readings, while resisting and 
criticizing the zeal that often results in interpretive leaps to an unearned certainty of 
meaning“ and remaining attentive to “the complexity of the texts themselves, their 
histories, and their present situations,“ SCHOLES, supra note 36, at 219) is supported, albeit 
unwittingly, by Justice Scalia in the famous opening line of his dissent: “The Court has 
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”  Romer at 636 (emphasis added). 
190 See RORTY, supra note 45, at 27-28.
191 Goodridge, supra note 44, at 312. 
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Marshall engages us by articulating the primary American marriage 
narrative, a narrative whose moral logic extends straight back to Reynolds192
and affirms the ideological community of traditional marriage advocates.  
As with Kennedy’s opening in Romer, which effectively creates an 
ideological community centered on the value of anti-racism, this rhetorical 
framing makes of most readers (particularly opponents of same-sex 
marriage) a coherent ideological community centered on the social value of 
marriage.  And, as in Romer, this leaves only the question of the degree to 
which that community will remain intact through the next step of the court’s 
narrative-argument.
That step takes a decidedly literary form, characterizing carefully 
and respectfully  the two ideological communities in conflict over this issue 
and punctuating that pair of community narratives with a succinct statement 
of judicial purpose: 
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical 
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one man 
and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral.  Many 
hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical convictions that 
same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that homosexual 
persons should be treated no differently than their heterosexual 
neighbors. . . . Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.193
This last sentence offers a kind of moderating (if not re-unifying) judicial 
narrative, a reminder that courts must work to transcend, insofar as that is 
possible, the concrete disputes before them, and to resolve those disputes 
from a position of principle.  Here, that principle – that narrative of “liberty 
of all“ – echoes Kennedy’s invocation of the “law’s neutrality where the 
rights of persons are at stake.“194
Just as Kennedy did in both Romer and Lawrence,195 here Marshall 
creates, by rhetorical appeal to a widely revered value, an ideological 
community of readers.  The court’s next step, into a copious discussion 
declaring unconstitutional the “Commonwealth[s‘] . . . use [of] its 
formidable regulatory authority to bar same-sex couples from civil 
marriage,“196 is where this ideological community – one unified by a belief 
192 Supra text at 37-42.
193 Goodridge, supra note 44, at 312 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
194 Romer at 623.
195 Supra note 193.
196 Goodridge at 312-13.
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in “the liberty of all“ – divides into distinct interpretive communities along 
lines of religious and cultural values.  Just what values the ideological 
community of “the liberty of all“ should include is, of course, where the 
bulk of the debate over same-sex marriage resides.  Nevertheless, 
Marshall’s rhetorical strategies in legally framing that debate are admirably 
literary in their open, principled attempt to fairly characterize and evaluate 
the values and complexities of each side.  This, like Kennedy’s approach in 
Romer, stands in contrast to the preemptivve, fundamentalist framing 
choices that White deploys in Bowers.
Conclusion
In a pluralistic liberal democracy, the importance of “crafty“ 
narrative habits cannot be overestimated.  Such “literary“ discursive 
methods and attitudes enable genuinely meaningful public discourse and the 
consequent, ongoing revision of the boundaries of ideological communities.  
These conditions, in turn, make more possible for all the pursuit of 
legitimate individual and communal autonomy, because such a self-
conscious, self-revising narrative ethos leads us to negotiate, if not resolve, 
our complex differences openly, such that we know where we stand with 
each other when fresh controversy invites our baser impulses. 
The alternative, fundamentalism of thought and speech, is inherently 
violent, imposing on ourselves and others reductive narratives of self and 
community that narrow our ethical vision and  distort our mutual 
understanding – “mediation“ of the most destructive kind.  Michael Bronski 
puts this narrative violence in the context of the same-sex marriage debate:  
[Y]ou don’t win the right to marry by telling the world that 
queer people’s lives are as confusing, messy, tattered, and 
complicated as heterosexual lives.  You win the right to 
marry, it seems, by presenting to the world, and to the courts, 
the most acceptable, most homogeneous, most lovable, most 
traditional couples (with kids if possible) you can find.  
Given that marriage is, for everyone, a form of sexual 
regulation, it is also important to present to the world the 
most conventional images of gay behavior.197
197
 Bronski, supra note 151.  Of course, given the universal desire for cultural 
legitimacy, it is not difficult to understand the appeal of marriage to homosexuals: 
So why would gay people want to get married?  Part of the answer is that 
in a world wracked by homophobia, getting an official okay on your 
relationship feels great.  It is validating and it mutes some of the hurt and 
pain inflicted on so many queers by their families, neighbors, co-
workers, and society at large.” 
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Without question, Bronski believes in the rightness of granting 
homosexuals equality in the marriage context.  Nevertheless, he suggests 
that the cost to homosexuals of winning the right to marry is perhaps too 
dear.  The cultural assimilation required for such “narrative“ equality would 
compel gays to become truly fundamentalist self-narrators, borrowing and 
living out an oppressive narrative provided by someone else.198  This kind of 
derivative cultural legitimacy would come at the expense of whatever hard-
earned sense of autonomy homosexuals, as individuals and as a community, 
have achieved.  
The consequences of our fundamentalist habits of mind are all about 
us, in our political campaigns, our culture wars, our shrill internet blogging.  
The world we inhabit reminds us daily that such habits of mind, when 
indulged to the extreme, pose serious danger to intellectual freedom, to 
cultural tolerance, and to social peace.  This need not be the path we take, 
though it is surely the easiest one.        
Id. 
198 See RORTY, supra note 45, at 27-28.
